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SECRET ALGORITHMS, IP RIGHTS, AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Meghan J. Ryan*
The secrecy surrounding the algorithms that play a central role in American
life today is proving to have alarming effects. Judges and juries are convicting
defendants based on secret evidence. Major advertisers like Facebook are discriminating against minorities seeking housing. And Russians may very well be
hacking our voting machines to change election outcomes. The algorithm secrecy
underlying these results obscures whether such legal outcomes are actually accurate and fair or whether they were based on faulty evidence, affected by bias, or
manipulated by outside influences. These are just a handful of the public-interest
perils of algorithm secrecy. This Article explains that the pervasive secrecy surrounding algorithms is not entirely by accident. The Supreme Court’s recent
overhaul of intellectual property (IP) law has driven algorithm developers toward secrecy. By limiting patent protection for software, the Court’s new IP regime pushes developers away from the required disclosure of patent law and toward the obscurity of trade secret law. In doing so, the new regime neglects to
take into account the many negative effects that this heightened secrecy has on
the public interest. Accuracy, fairness, and good policy require a more careful
consideration of the tradeoffs between secrecy and transparency. This includes
not only exploring how to minimize these swelling public-interest concerns but
also reexamining the Court’s new IP rules with these negative effects in mind.
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INTRODUCTION
Judges and juries are convicting defendants based on secret evidence.1 Major advertisers such as Facebook are discriminating against minorities seeking
housing.2 And Russians may be hacking our voting machines to change election outcomes.3 These are just some of the evils that have followed a burgeoning secrecy ensconcing the algorithms that play such a central role in American
life today.4 Transparency has an important role to play in ensuring the accuracy
of these algorithms and the fairness of the outcomes they produce. But the U.S.
Supreme Court’s recent change of course in intellectual property (IP) law now
means that, where algorithm-based software is concerned, the law encourages
trade secret protection over patent protection. This translates into encouraging
algorithm secrecy over algorithm transparency. Considering the injustices that
flow from this policy preference for trade secret over patent protection, however, courts really ought to consider the public-interest perils resulting from this
decision.
The recent landmark case of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank5 ushered in a new era
of IP rights. This case, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a software pa-

1

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
3
See infra Section II.C. Please note that, although this Article does express concern about
the security of our elections, is does not suggest that the 2020 presidential election was stolen, hacked, or produced fraudulent results.
4
See generally Machine Bias: Investigating Algorithmic Injustice, PROPUBLICA,
https://www.propublica.org/series/machine-bias [https://perma.cc/P697-4FLM] (investigating and reporting a series of stories on “algorithmic injustice and the formulas that influence
our lives”).
5
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
2
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tent on the ground that abstract ideas such as algorithms cannot be patented,6
left IP lawyers and their clients scrambling for how to deal with their proprietary technologies. The prospects for successfully patenting software, computerized algorithms, and other similar technologies are now dubious. And considering that the patent system is based on a tradeoff of surrendering secrecy for
gaining a short-term monopoly on an idea,7 the loss of patent rights—or even
just uncertainty about patent rights—has led to increased secrecy surrounding
companies’ technologies. Understandably, if a company is unable to successfully patent its technology and obtain a short-term monopoly on the invention,
the company will want to maintain the secrecy of the technology.8 Further,
companies have an incentive to bolster that secrecy so that, even if they cannot
obtain patent rights, they can secure trade secret rights on the technology.9
In this milieu of uncertainty, there has been concern that the American
framework for innovation is collapsing.10 If companies are not disclosing their
6

See id. at 212 (“We hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”).
7
See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (suggesting that the
limited monopoly available under patent law is “a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new
knowledge”; that “grant[ing] an exclusive right to an invention [is] the creation of society—
at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas—and [i]s not to be freely given”; and
that “[o]nly inventions and discoveries which further[] human knowledge, and [a]re new and
useful, justif[y] the special inducement of a limited private monopoly”); see also Clarisa
Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 626–27 (2002) (referring to this—“fram[ing]
intellectual property in general, and patents in particular, as an exchange of information for
protection”—as “[t]he simple view”); infra note 25.
8
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 21–22 (1984) (explaining that program developers generally only make their programs available to the public if they are compensated). But see generally Long, supra note 7,
at 627 (urging readers to “relax the assumption that the private value of a patent is based
solely on the ability to capture rents and exclude others from using the invention”).
9
See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.03 (2020)
(“[F]ailure to use efforts reasonable under the circumstances to protect matter claimed to be
a trade secret is necessarily fatal to the claim. . . . The value, then, of a trade secret rests in
maintenance of secrecy.”); see also generally Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No.
114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (creating a federal private cause of action for trade secret misappropriation); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (1979) (UNIF. L. COMM’N, amended 1985) (providing
model rules for trade secret protection).
10
See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
aff’d, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (Moore, J., dissenting) (warning that “if all of these claims . . . are
not patent-eligible, this case is the death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including all
business method, financial system, and software patents as well as many computer implemented and telecommunications patents” and concluding that this “would decimate the electronics and software industries”); Brief for Paul R. Michel as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 9, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (No. 13-298) (arguing that the Court in Alice should “return to its seminal precedent in Diehr, a computer
case” and stating that following “the aberrational approach of Flook or the unworkable notion of relative abstractness of Bilski will complicate, confuse, and confound the patent law”
and “also cripple, if not destroy, computer-related industries, of which there are many and
which are vital to the future of the country in today's highly competitive global economy.”);
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technologies but are in fact strengthening the secrecy masking their technologies, then other inventors cannot build on the already-existing technologies.
This slows innovation. The trajectory that we are set upon is troubling.
The incentive for secrecy that Alice created has fueled an additional troubling development in the domain of the public interest. As companies migrate
from patent to trade secret protection and bolster the secrecy surrounding their
new technologies, not only do these technologies become unavailable to the
companies’ competitors, but they also become unavailable to the general public
more broadly.11 This means that it is significantly more difficult to verify the
important results these technologies produce by assessing the accuracy and
fairness of their underlying algorithms.
This is already playing out in the criminal justice arena. For example, criminal defendants are often convicted by evidence such as breathalyzer results,
fingerprint matches, and DNA analyses. These pieces of evidence are rooted in
various computerized algorithms that have often been developed by independent technology companies and are ordinarily claimed as proprietary in nature.12
From the perspective of the companies, this is perfectly understandable; they
seek to profit off their investments in research and development. From the perspective of the criminal defendant, however, the proprietary—and thus secret—
nature of these computerized algorithms is unfair. Although such a claim of unfairness has been asserted by only a handful of criminal defendants,13 this is not
because the secret nature of these computerized algorithms on which convictions are based is not troubling; it is instead because, due to the sorry state of
public funding for the assistance of counsel, many attorneys representing these
defendants are not even aware that this is an issue.14 But it is an important issue. Under the Constitution, criminal defendants must “be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense”15 and to “confront[] . . . the witKevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine
Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 952 (2017)
(“Like the Four Horsemen, Bilski, Mayo, Myriad, and Alice have cut through the innovation
industries, striking down wide swaths of patent applications and issued patents.”); see also
Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?, 71
VAND. L. REV. 765, 776 (2018) (explaining that commentators “worry that the restriction of
patent eligibility threatens innovation, particularly in the fields of biotechnology and medical
diagnostics”).
11
See infra text accompanying notes 31–34.
12
See Meghan J. Ryan, Secret Conviction Programs, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 269, 303–05
(2020).
13
See id. at 306, 313, 319–20.
14
See id. at 323–24 (suggesting that criminal justice actors lack the scientific and technological knowledge to understand the nuances of algorithms and source codes and noting that the
sorry state of public defense in this country often allows for these issues to be overlooked).
15
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); see also Holmes v. South Carolina,
547 U.S. 319, 319 (2006) (“[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690
(1986))); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (“The right of an accused in a
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nesses against [them].”16 Without access to the details of the computerized algorithms providing incriminating evidence against them, these defendants lack
the opportunity to challenge this incriminating evidence that poses real questions of accuracy, not to mention bias.
These concerns of accuracy and bias, which stem from a lack of transparency and public access, are also popping up in areas such as housing and voting. For example, there are allegations that Facebook’s advertisement-targeting
software discriminates against minorities in housing—a move that runs contrary to the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 There is also evidence indicating that the algorithms used in voting machines are vulnerable to
outside manipulation, which threatens to undermine the foundations of our democracy.18 In these contexts, too, the walls of secrecy shield from public scrutiny the independently developed technologies on which private companies and
the government are regularly relying.
This troublesome clash between secrecy and transparency emerges from
the increasing reliance on technology in legal decisionmaking and the competing interests of the technology developers, technology users, and general public. The dynamics among these different populations vary depending on the
technology, making it difficult to find a universally applicable solution. In
some circumstances, making the algorithm available under seal or allowing it to
be viewed in camera might satisfy the users and public clamoring for access
while simultaneously addressing the developers’ primary concerns. Under other
conditions, pushing the developers and users into exclusive license agreements
that would mitigate the developers’ disclosure anxieties could be feasible. But
in some situations, as in the voting context, transparency poses concerns in addition to the developers’ IP rights, such as security issues. Because each scenario differs, attention must be paid to the various stakeholders and risks involved
to find the appropriate balance of secrecy and transparency. A more universal
approach might be possible, however, by reassessing the new rules of IP rights
in play after Alice. If courts were to take into account these various publicinterest perils that flow from secrecy when they sketch the shifting boundaries
of IP rights, many of these risks and harms could be avoided.
This Article pinpoints the new regime of IP law as a significant contributor
to the algorithm secrecy problem imperiling the public interest and advances a
handful of approaches to minimize the negative effects flowing from the secrecy incentives created by Alice. Apart from this patchwork approach to mitigating the effects of algorithm secrecy, this Article suggests that courts should seriously consider the impacts on the public interest when charting the boundaries
of IP protection, at least where software-related algorithm secrecy is involved.
criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against
the State’s accusations.”).
16
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17
See infra Section II.B.
18
See infra Section II.C.
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Part I of this Article lays the foundation, explaining the basic tenets of IP law
and chronicling how the Supreme Court has recently narrowed subject matter
eligibility for patents where computerized algorithms are concerned, thus pushing software developers in the direction of protecting their inventions through
trade secret law instead. Naturally, this results in greater secrecy ensconcing
these algorithms. Part II describes how many of these algorithms affect our
everyday lives and how keeping them secret can have a real impact in various
public-interest arenas. For example, judges and juries are convicting criminal
defendants based on the results these secret algorithms produce even though
questions have arisen about the accuracy of these results.19 Further, companies
such as Facebook rely on secret algorithms in their advertisement targeting,
which could discriminate against certain types of individuals in critical markets
like housing.20 And we rely on these secret algorithms in assessing the outcomes of our elections even though, again, there are accuracy questions and,
relatedly, questions about whether the algorithms have allowed for security
breaches.21 Finally, Part III suggests that, in the interest of justice, we must
strike a better balance between the needs for secrecy and transparency where
the public interest is involved. The risks of secrecy and transparency differ depending on the context, so it is necessary to carefully assess these risks in determining the proper balance. Further, the problem of algorithm secrecy calls
out for a broader solution that hearkens back to a significant contributor to the
predicament: the new IP regime after Alice. In continuing to construct the
boundaries of IP protections, courts ought to consider the public-interest impacts that stem from their decisions. These legal and policy determinations
should not be made with blinders on but should instead consider how secrecy
and transparency will impact important public-interest areas.
I.

THE NEW RULES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

Inventors have taken advantage of various IP protections for over a century.22 Patents, copyrights, trademarks, and, somewhat later, trade secrets have
traditionally occupied different territories, but software is unique in that it possesses characteristics that lend themselves to various types of IP protection.
This has led to some uncertainty about how developers can best protect their
19

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
21
See infra Section II.C.
22
See William W. Fisher III, Geistiges Eigentum - ein ausufernder Rechtsbereich: Die Geschichte des Ideenschutzes in den Vereinigten Staaten [The Growth of Intellectual Property:
A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States], in 130 EIGENTUM IM
INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 265, 270 (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1999), https://cyber.harva
rd.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC94-TWE5] (outlining the history of
IP law in the United States); see also Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law
and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 498 (2010) (explaining that “the development of trade secret law in
the United State[s] began in 1837”).
20
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technologies. But this uncertainty was significantly magnified when the Supreme Court recently shook the foundations of IP law by severely limiting patent protection for software. This has pushed software developers to seek protection in trade secret law instead, which translates into a shift from disclosing
the details of software to keeping them secret.
A. Foundations
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to “secur[e] for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries” for the purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”23 Congress put this authority into action through a series of statutes
preserving authors’ and inventors’ works via patent, copyright, trademark, and
even trade secret protection.24 In large part, Congress has opted to promote scientific and artistic progress through providing inventors and authors with a limited monopoly on their work in exchange for sharing their work with the community.25 For example, Title 35 of the U.S. Code states that, if an inventor
discloses a new, useful, and nonobvious invention with sufficient particularity,
and if he also pays the relevant fees to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), then he is entitled to patent protection—a twenty-year term of exclusivity on his invention.26 Title 17 provides that, if an author creates an original
23

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
24
See 17 U.S.C.; 18 U.S.C §§ 1831–1839; 35 U.S.C., (laying out the definitions and boundaries of patents, copyrights, and trade secrets); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (amending various parts of Title 35).
25
See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (suggesting that the
limited monopoly available under patent law is “a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new
knowledge”; that “grant[ing] . . . an exclusive right to an invention [is] the creation of society—at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas—and [is] not to be freely given”;
and that “[o]nly inventions and discoveries which further[] human knowledge, and [a]re new
and useful, justif[y] the special inducement of a limited private monopoly”); see also Long,
supra note 7, at 626 (referring to this—“fram[ing] intellectual property in general, and patents in particular, as an exchange of information for protection”—as “[t]he simple view”).
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Supreme Court explained:
The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.” As we have noted in the past, the Clause contains both a grant
of power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power. Congress may not create patent
monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it “authorize the issuance of patents whose effects
are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials
already available.”

489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 6).
26
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to [certain] conditions . . . .”); id. § 103 (providing that,
to obtain such a patent, though, the invention must be new, useful, and nonobvious “to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains”); id. §§ 111–12
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work fixed in a tangible form, he is entitled to copyright protection, which
amounts to exclusivity of his work for the duration of his life plus seventy years
thereafter.27 Moreover, if the author goes through the steps to register his copyright, he is entitled to additional protections amounting to the ability to sue for
infringement, potentially obtain an injunction, and recover an array of damages
and attorneys’ fees.28 Constitutional bargains like these benefit inventors and
artists by allowing them to profit from exclusivity, and they simultaneously
benefit society by allowing its members access to these inventions and arts.29
Society can simply consume this wealth of information or even build upon it,
further fueling scientific and artistic progress.30
Trade secret law complements these patent and copyright protections. But
trade secret law is in some ways the exact opposite in that it protects secrets—
disclosure is not required, and in fact disclosure inhibits the ability to protect
the IP at issue.31 Pursuant to this corner of IP law, one may to a certain extent
(providing that a patent application should include a “specification . . . contain[ing] a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and . . . set[ting]
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention”); id. § 154 (“Subject to the payment of fees . . . [the] grant [of a patent] shall be for a
term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on
which the application for the patent was filed . . . .”).
27
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”); id. § 302 (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after
the author’s death.”).
28
See MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 401[C] (5th ed. Supp.
2020). An author may not file an infringement suit unless he first registers the copyright. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 411–412; EPSTEIN, supra, at § 401[C]. Note, however, that different rules apply
if the work originated outside the United States. See EPSTEIN, supra, at § 401[C]. Although
an author may bring claims based on infringements even prior to registration, such an author
is not entitled to the full panoply of remedies that an author suing on infringements subsequent to registration is entitled. See id. (“In addition to prohibiting the institution of an infringement suit until after registration, the [Copyright] Act conditions the remedies of statutory damages and attorneys’ fees on having registered the copyright before infringement.”
(footnotes omitted)). The author of a work not registered at the time of infringement may be
entitled to an injunction and actual damages, but the author of a registered work may also be
entitled to statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. See id. Where published works are concerned, the statute provides a three-month grace period. See id.
29
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
30
See supra note 25.
31
See Orly Lobel, Filing for a Patent Versus Keeping Your Invention a Trade Secret, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 21, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/11/filing-for-a-patent-versus-keeping-yourinvention-a-trade-secret [https://perma.cc/3MNQ-QAUF] (“Patents and trade secrets present
opposing choices. Trade secrets derive their legal protection from their inherently secret nature. Patents, by contrast, can only be protected through public disclosure.”); see also 2
MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 9, at § 9.02[2][a] (“Trade secret law is pertinent to patent

21 NEV. L.J. 61

Fall 2020]

SECRET ALGORITHMS

69

protect his invention or special knowledge if it constitutes a “trade secret,”
meaning that the individual has taken reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of information that derives economic value from its secrecy.32 Although
trade secret law does not provide as robust protection as patent or copyright
law, it does provide some protection against the misappropriation of that trade
secret. If another misappropriates the trade secret—discovering it directly or
indirectly “by improper means,” or disclosing it in breach of the trade secret

licensing because it provides an independent, complementary form of industrial property
which in some instances offers alternative protective umbrellas for patentable technology
and, in others, may together serve to protect subject matter that is the same or closely related
to patented matter.”). Professors Sharon Sandeen and Ulla-Maija Mylly have explained:
As with . . . IP . . . laws more generally, the theory underlying trade secret protection is that society gets something that is of greater benefit than the advantages that flow from information diffusion and free competition. In the case of trade secrets, this includes the prevention of unfair
competition and additional incentives for invention and creation over and above what is provided by patent and copyright laws.

Sharon K. Sandeen & Ulla-Maija Mylly, Trade Secrets and the Right to Information: A
Comparative Analysis of E.U. and U.S. Approaches to Freedom of Expression and Whistleblowing, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2020). There is a dark side to trade secret law, though. It
has been used to hide facts like the dangerousness of pesticides and cigarettes. See FRANK
PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND
INFORMATION 12 (2015).
32
See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–36); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1979) (UNIF.
L. COMM’N, amended 1985). The Defend Trade Secrets Act provides:
[T]he term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical,
economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices,
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes,
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if–
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Restatement (First) of Torts, and Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition define “trade secret” in much the same way. See
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1979) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1979, amended 1985) (“ ‘Trade
secret’ ” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that . . . (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and . . . (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1939) (“A trade
secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 39 (AM. L. INST. 1995) (“A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation
of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”).
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holder’s confidence—trade secret law provides certain limited remedies.33
Once the information has been made public, though, there is little that can be
done to mitigate the resulting damages. Individuals and entities that learn of the
information without engaging in inappropriate behaviors themselves are free to
use the information, draining the value of the secret for the original trade secret
holder. Indeed, “[a] trade secret once lost is . . . lost forever.”34
The various categories of IP have traditionally been siloed under the law.
One’s disclosed work could be categorized as falling into the patent, copyright,
or trademark categories, or one could opt to maintain the secrecy of his work.
This choice between secrecy and disclosure often amounts to a choice between
patent and trade secret protection, though.35 With respect to copyright and
trademark protections, there is little reason to choose secrecy because it is often
difficult to monetize one’s work without disclosure in these instances.
The choice between the disclosure of patent law and the concealment of
trade secret law can sometimes be a difficult one. Numerous considerations affect whether businesses pursue patent protection or seek to preserve trade se-

33

See 18 U.S.C. § 1839; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (1979) (UNIF. L. COMM’N,
amended 1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. L. INST. 1995);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM. L. INST. 1939). The Defend Trade Secrets Act
provides:
(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to a product or service used in
or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other
than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that
trade secret, knowingly–
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud,
artifice, or deception obtains such information;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such information;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to have been stolen or
appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in paragraphs
(1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both.
(b) Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not
more than the greater of $5,000,000 or 3 times the value of the stolen trade secret to the organization, including expenses for research and design and other costs of reproducing the trade secret
that the organization has thereby avoided.

18 U.S.C. § 1832.
34
FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
35
Orly Lobel has helpfully explained that “trade secret law and patent law can coexist,”
though, and that, within a particular client’s portfolio, a patent might “protect the broad concept, while trade secret[] [might] protect the production details.” Lobel, supra note 31.
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crets on any of their inventions. Some factors that one might consider in choosing the best category include the following:36
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

36

Whether the invention actually qualifies for patent protection;37
The limited duration of a patent—today only twenty years—compared
to the potential perpetuity of a trade secret;38
The life-cycle of the invention—whether the typical twenty-fourmonth time period for obtaining a patent exceeds the amount of time
there will be demand for the product on the market;39
The high price of obtaining a patent, including the costs of retaining
legal assistance and the fees owed to the PTO, compared to the relative
affordability of maintaining a trade secret;40
The risk of trade secret misappropriation and disclosure of the secret to
the public;41
The risk that a trade secret will be exposed through legal means, such
as through independent invention or reverse-engineering, and thus lose
its trade secret protection;42

“[B]ecause this choice is frequently encountered in the real world, academics and practitioners have developed a well-established body of literature describing the considerations
that should be taken into account when deciding between patent and trade secret protection.”
Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 637
(2013). Some additional considerations include “business concerns, antitrust issues, and industry-specific cultural views of patents.” David Hricik, Will Patenting Make as Much Sense
in the New Regime of Weakened Patent Rights and Shorter Product Life Cycles?, 20 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 457, 506 (2017). For a more robust discussion of relevant factors, see
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 380–406
(2002).
37
See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 636 (“[B]ecause the scope of trade secret law is much
broader than that of patent law, some valuable information—like a customer list or a marketing strategy—may qualify as a trade secret but be ineligible for patent protection.”).
38
See id. at 630 (“[O]nce the [trade] secret is disclosed, it is lost forever. On the other hand,
if the secret is kept, trade secret law offers protection in perpetuity.” (footnotes omitted)).
Often, “[t]he duration of an IP right is among its most important characteristics . . . .” Id. at
637. Accordingly, Andrew Schwartz has argued that corporations should generally prefer
trade secrets over patents so that the corporations—“perpetual entities”—may
“reap . . . perpetual returns that only a trade secret can offer.” Id. at 623, 649.
39
See Hricik, supra note 36, at 498–506.
40
See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 644–46 (“The conventional analysis teaches that cost is a
key concern when it comes to choosing between patent and trade secret protection. This includes both the cost of obtaining IP protection, and the cost of maintaining that protection,
including through litigation.” (footnotes omitted)).
41
See FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (“A trade secret once lost is, of course, lost forever.”); see also David S. Levine &
Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 780
(2018) (“It is notable that, in at least one study, the risk of departing employees misappropriating trade secrets did not appear to justify using patents instead of trade secrecy and other
mechanisms.”).
42
See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 639–40. Contributors to this risk might include whether
the product is “regularly observed in public settings” and whether “the invention [is] detectable and embedded in the product itself or is [] part of an internal manufacturing process[.]”
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The “signal value” that patents provide to third parties;43 and
The extent to which patent protection will enhance the liquidity and alienability of the information.44

One challenge is that, because of various unknowns, it is often difficult to determine ex ante the type of protection that will prove best for any particular invention or client.
B. The Complexity of Software
The complexity of the question as to how best protect one’s inventions and
valuable information has grown as rapidly advancing technology, especially in
areas related to computing, has overtaken our world. During the software boom
in the 1970s and 1980s, software developers generally protected their products
as trade secrets.45 This may have resulted from the uncertainty of seeking other
forms of protection.46 Over time, though, these developers sought other, more
robust, forms of protection for their inventions and thus turned to copyright and
patent law.47 This shift highlighted some tensions among the various forms of
IP protection. Through the lens of IP law, computer software is a “hybrid”
product: Software is expressed in a written form, similar to a manuscript deserving of copyright protection, but software is functional in nature, which is
similar to an invention ripe for patent protection.48 This blend of characteristics
has raised significant questions about the proper, or most successful, vehicle for
Lobel, supra note 31. Some commentators consider the risks of independent invention and
reverse-engineering as part of the duration analysis. See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 637–40.
43
Schwartz, supra note 36, at 641–42 (“The possession of a patent—any patent—conveys a
strong positive ‘signal’ to outsiders, regardless of the technical merit of the actual invention.”). See generally Long, supra note 7 (emphasizing the signaling value of patents). “Further, patents may be useful for building a portfolio of intellectual property assets, which
firms can trade (e.g., by cross-licensing agreements) if a competitor asserts a patent against
them.” Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1746, 1774 (2011).
44
See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 643–45. As Andrew Schwartz explained:
Both patents and trade secrets may be sold, licensed, or otherwise alienated. Patent, however,
has a clear advantage over trade secrecy in that a patent is much easier, cheaper and less risky to
alienate than a trade secret. This also makes a patent a more liquid asset than a trade secret.

Id. at 643.
45
See Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for
Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2652 (1994) (noting that the software industry
“developed principally through trade secret protection”).
46
See MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY, FROM AIRLINE RESERVATIONS TO SONIC THE HEDGEHOG:
A HISTORY OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 107–08 (2003) (noting the uncertainty of patent protection and the usefulness of trade secret protection in the early days of software development); Menell, supra note 45, at 2652 (noting the early usefulness of trade secret law).
47
See infra Sections I.B.1, I.B.2.
48
Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection—Integrating Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret
Law, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 151, 151 (1987) (“In intellectual property terms,
software is a true hybrid. . . . It is the hybrid nature of software that causes its failure to fit
neatly into any one existing category of intellectual property, resulting in seemingly endless
confusion as to how it may best be protected.”).
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protection. Although there were a lot of bumps and bruises along the way, by
the mid-1990s, software developers had generally found a way to “muddl[e]
through” the difficulties of seeking patent and copyright protection for software.49
1. Copyrights
The Copyright Act provides protection for a “computer program”—“a set
of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result.”50 Under § 102, copyright protection is reserved for expressive material, though.51 The statute specifically excludes from
protection “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery.”52 With respect to software, the legislative history of
the Copyright Act makes clear that “the expression adopted by the programmer
is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope
of the copyright law.”53
Despite the statute directly addressing computer programs, there has been
some historical uncertainty about the scope of protection for software under the
statute. Software does not fall squarely within traditional copyright subject matter like literary manuscripts; it is instead mostly functional in nature even
though it is expressed in text through source and object code.54 Separating these
distinct facets of software can be difficult, and this is exacerbated by the fact
that judges ordinarily lack the technical expertise to clearly and competently
separate the functional elements of software—which would be more appropri-

49

Menell, supra note 45, at 2652. Commenting on the state of IP protection for software in
1994, Peter Menell stated:
After many years of confusion, the existing legal regime appears to be muddling through. In the
view of most commentators, the recent Altai and Sega decisions have correctly resolved two of
the three major problems that have plagued copyright protection for software. The Lotus case,
which presents the scope of copyright protection for user interfaces, could potentially resolve the
last major difficulty inherent in the application of copyright law to computer software. Patent
protection for software may prove to be problematic, although the extent of problems to date has
been modest.

Id. at 2652–53 (footnotes omitted).
50
17 U.S.C. § 101; see also 17 U.S.C. § 117 (outlining some limitations on copyright protection where computer programs are at issue).
51
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
52
Id. at § 102(b).
53
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976).
54
See Pamela Samuelson, Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the Shadow of
Patents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 243, 295–96 (2019).

21 NEV. L.J. 61

74

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:1

ately protected under patent law—from the expressive aspects of software—
which would be more appropriately protected under copyright law.55
It has generally been uncontroversial that copyright protects against the literal infringement of source and object code.56 This protection, however, is limited to the extent that computer programmers can reverse-engineer a program
and author new code to achieve the same function with relative ease.57 Thus,
the breadth of copyright protection in nonliteral infringement cases is important, and, perhaps not surprisingly, it has been more difficult to ascertain in
these types of cases.58
One area where there has been uncertainty about the scope of copyright
protection is related to the “structure, sequence, and organization” (SSO) of
computer programs, as well as programs’ “look and feel.”59 Initially, the Third
Circuit determined that a program having an overall similar function and structure infringed the pre-existing program.60 Comparing software to other literary
works, the court explained that “copyrights of other literary works can be infringed even when there is no substantial similarity between the works’ literal
elements.”61 Six years later, the Second Circuit rejected this approach and significantly limited copyright protection for software.62 The court set forth a
three-part test to determine whether a software copyright has been infringed:
The first step involves constructing a hierarchy of abstractions, from most abstract to most detailed, for the plaintiff’s program. The second step involves filtering out from the analysis various elements of the program that are beyond the
scope of copyright protection. The third step involves comparing any remaining
“golden nuggets” of expression in the plaintiff’s program with the defendant’s

55

See id.
See id. (“Over the past several decades, the only easily resolved software copyright cases
have been those in which plaintiffs proved that defendants literally infringed source or object
code or copied videogame audiovisuals or other expressive screen displays generated by
programs.”); Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1748 (“[N]o one seriously questioned that source
code forms of programs could be copyrighted as written texts . . . .”).
57
See Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1752 (noting that, “[i]f programmers could easily rewrite code, and thereby avoid infringement of the first developer’s copyright, then little
would be gained by the extension of copyright protection to programs”). But cf. Samuelson,
supra note 54, at 295 (“Copyright provides very meaningful protection to these elements of
programs.”).
58
See Samuelson, supra note 54, at 295 (“Nonliteral infringement claims have proven much
more difficult for courts to resolve . . . .”).
59
See Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1765–71.
60
See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab’y, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir.
1986) (“We hold that (1) copyright protection of computer programs may extend beyond the
programs’ literal code to their structure, sequence, and organization, and (2) the district
court’s finding of substantial similarity between the Dentalab and Dentcom programs was
not clearly erroneous.”); see also Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1765–66 (summarizing the
Whelan decision).
61
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234.
62
See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705–06 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]e
think that [the district court judge] wisely declined to follow Whelan.”).
56
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program to determine if the defendant copied substantial amounts of expression
from the plaintiff’s program.63

“Thin[ning]” out copyright protection in this way, the court suggested that
Congress could provide additional copyright protection for software if desirable.64 Following the Second Circuit’s analysis in this case, courts have further
constrained copyright protection for software.65
Another area where there has been uncertainty about the scope of copyright
protection is related to reverse-engineering.66 Does creating copies—either exact or very similar—of source or object code for the purpose of investigating
the program’s function and recreating parts of the program using different code
to achieve interoperability constitute fair use?67 In 1992, the Ninth Circuit determined that this was indeed fair use.68 In deciding this, the court built on the
Second Circuit’s understanding of software as “utilitarian works that were eligible for only thin copyright protection.”69 It explained that, “[i]n order to enjoy
a lawful monopoly over the idea or functional principle underlying a work, the
creator of the work must satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the
patent laws.”70
Although the uncertainty about the applicability of copyright law to software reigned until the early 1990s, after these cases, it became clear that copyright protection as applied to software would be quite limited.71 This pushed
software developers to seek protection elsewhere, namely in the realm of patent
law.72

63

Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1770 (footnotes omitted); see also Altai, 982 F.2d at 706–
10.
64
See Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1771; see also Altai, 982 F.2d at 712 (“[N]ow that more
than 12 years have passed since CONTU issued its final report, the resolution of this specific
issue could benefit from further legislative investigation—perhaps a CONTU II.”).
65
See Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1771 (“After Altai, courts became more openly skeptical
about claims of copyright protection for the ‘look and feel’ of programs, as such claims typically sought to protect the now unprotected utilitarian aspects of programs.”).
66
See id. at 1772.
67
See id. (“Closely related to the SSO-in-interfaces controversy resolved in Altai was
whether making copies of program code for the purpose of gaining access to information
necessary to achieve interoperability was fair use.”).
68
See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Where there is
good reason for studying or examining the unprotected aspects of a copyrighted computer
program, disassembly for purposes of such study or examination constitutes a fair use.”); see
also Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1772.
69
Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1772; see also Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1520–27.
70
Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1526.
71
See Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1773.
72
See id. (“The ‘thinness’ of copyright protection for programs after Altai and Sega seems
to have contributed to a shift among software developers away from heavy reliance on copyright protection for program SSO and toward a greater reliance on patents.”).
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2. Patents
At the dawn of the software revolution, the PTO seemed open to the patentability of software.73 As software boomed, pressure mounted regarding the
need to address whether software indeed constitutes patentable subject matter.74
In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson appointed a committee to study the
matter, and the committee overwhelmingly concluded that software should not
be patentable.75 Following this lead, the PTO issued a set of guidelines advising
that the patentability of software would be severely limited.76 The PTO’s stated
reason was that software is just the automation of “mental steps,” which are
unpatentable in nature.77
In the following decade, the Supreme Court decided a handful of cases explaining the limitations on patenting software. Section 101 of the Patent Act
provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to [other] conditions and requirements of th[e] [Act].”78 Although this provision articulating the scope of
patentable subject matter seems quite broad, the Court has historically held that
there are three exceptions to this permissive language:79
[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable. . . . Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none.” . . . “Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as
they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” . . . And monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.80

The Court explained that, although “all inventions at some level embody, use,
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ide73

See Steven G. Steger, The Long and Winding Road to Greater Certainty in Software Patents, CBA REC., Apr. 2000, at 46, 47–48 (explaining that, “[i]n the early days of computer
software development, the PTO had seemed receptive to the idea of patenting properly
claimed software-related inventions”).
74
See id. at 48.
75
See id.
76
See id.
77
See id.
78
35 U.S.C. § 101.
79
See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (“ ‘We have long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas are not patentable.’ . . . We have interpreted § 101 and its predecessors in
light of this exception for more than 150 years.” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Ass’n
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013))); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (“The Court has long held
that this [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception.”).
80
Prometheus Lab’ys., Inc., 566 U.S. at 70–71 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), and Gottschalk v. Benson 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972)).
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as,” allowing patents on the most basic of concepts would wholly preempt progress.81
The Court first applied the exceptions to computer software in Gottschalk
v. Benson,82 where the Court examined the patentability of “a method of programming a general-purpose digital computer to convert signals from binarycoded decimal form into pure binary form.”83 The algorithm could “be carried
out in existing computers long in use, no new machinery being necessary,” and
it could “also be performed without a computer.”84 In its analysis, the Court relied on its § 101 exception that “an idea of itself is not patentable”85 and clarified that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work.”86 It explained that, in determining whether
the invention amounts to something more than a simple, unpatentable algorithm, it is relevant whether the invention includes a particular machine or
transformation.87 Because the “mathematical formula involved here ha[d] no
substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, . . . [a] patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”88 Accordingly, the Court
determined that the software could not be patented.89
Several years later, in Parker v. Flook,90 the Court assessed the patentability of a “Method for Updating Alarm Limits.”91 In determining that the software at issue could not be patented,92 the Court reiterated that disembodied algorithms are unpatentable and that patents are warranted on algorithm-based

81

Id. at 71 (“The Court has recognized, however, that too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law. For all inventions at some level embody,
use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”).
82
Benson, 409 U.S. at 64–65, 67 (1972).
83
Id. at 65.
84
Id. at 67.
85
Id. at 67 (alteration omitted) (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507
(1974)). The Court explained: “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.” Id. (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1852)).
86
Id.
87
See id. at 70 (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is
the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.”).
The Court noted, however, that it was “not hold[ing] that no process patent could ever qualify [for patentability] if it did not meet the requirements of [the machine-or-transformation
test].” Id. at 71.
88
Id. at 71–72.
89
See id. at 72–73.
90
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
91
Id. at 585.
92
The Court explained that “all that [the patent application] provide[d] [was] a formula for
computing an updated alarm limit.” Id. at 586, 594.
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inventions only if those inventions, themselves, are “new and useful.”93 Contrasting his claim to that in Benson, the inventor explained that granting the patent here would not wholly preempt the mathematical formula and that certain
“ ‘post-solution’ activity—the adjustment of the alarm limit to the figure computed according to the formula—distinguishe[d] [his] case from Benson and
ma[de] his process patentable.”94 The Court disagreed, however, explaining that
“[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious
in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance.”95
Then, in 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized for the first time that
computer software could be patented.96 In that case, Diamond v. Diehr,97 the
Court cut back somewhat on Benson and Flook. The Diehr Court found the
software at issue patentable because, although “several steps of the process
[employed] a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer,” it
“[could not] be disputed” that the patent “claims involve[d] the transformation
of an article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state.”98
After Diehr, then, software that relied on underlying algorithms could be patented so long as it was paired with a physical step, even if that physical step
was not new and was instead already known in the art.99 This case thus opened
the door to the patentability of software.
93

Id. at 591 (“Mackay Radio and Funk Bros. point to the proper analysis for this case: the
process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful.”). Interestingly, the Court made clear that its focus on the newness and usefulness of the invention
were questions of patentable subject matter under § 101 rather than questions of novelty under § 102 and obviousness under § 103. See id. at 588 (“This case turns entirely on the proper construction of § 101 . . . which describes the subject matter that is eligible for patent protection. It does not involve the familiar issues of novelty and obviousness that routinely arise
under §§ 102 and 103 when the validity of a patent is challenged.” (footnote omitted)).
94
Id. at 590.
95
Id.
96
See Lionel M. Lavenue, Database Rights and Technical Data Rights: The Expansion of
Intellectual Property for the Protection of Databases, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 14 (1997)
(“In the 1981 case of in Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court, for the first time, found computer software patentable.” (footnote omitted)); Arti K. Rai et al., University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1527 (2009) (“In the 1981
decision Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court gave its first clear indication that certain
types of software-implemented inventions were patentable.” (footnote omitted)); Dana A.
Remus, The Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1713 n.109
(2014) (“In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court’s first approval of software patentability occurred in Diamond v. Diehr . . . .”).
97
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
98
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
99
See id. at 187; Brieanna Dolmage, The Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter in the
United States, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2006) (“The Court's decision in Diehr distinguished cases that sought to patent computer software using mathematical algorithms in
conjunction with an additional physical step, even where the step was previously known in
the art.”). Although the Court had previously “resisted the patenting of software programs,
primarily on the ground that they constituted ‘mathematical algorithms,’ ” in Diehr the
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Following Diehr, the Supreme Court did not address the question of the extent that software is patentable until 2014,100 but, in the intervening thirty-three
years, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit gradually expanded the patentability of software.101 It first applied a test to assess whether software is patentable, examining whether the claim preempted the algorithm entirely or applied the algorithm to physical elements or processes that, themselves,
constituted patentable subject matter.102 Then, in 1994, the Federal Circuit
abandoned this test and narrowed the limitation on patenting software.103 In In
re Alappat,104 the Federal Circuit examined the patentability of an invention
that smoothed out an oscilloscope display by manipulating pixel intensities
based on their locations in the display.105 It found that the Diehr Court did not
intend to create a broad categorical exception to patentable subject matter for
software.106 Instead, the Federal Circuit explained that “[t]he plain and
unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may be patented if it meets the [other] requirements” in the Patent
Act.107 Indeed, in the 1980 case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,108 the Supreme
Court had stated that patentable subject matter includes “anything under the sun
that is made by man.”109 Referring back to Benson, Flook, and Diehr, the Federal Circuit explained that these seemingly limiting decisions simply clarified
“Court signaled a slight weakening in this resolve, upholding the patent on a software program (embedded in a computer) that served to monitor continuously the temperature inside a
synthetic rubber mold.” Fisher, supra note 22, at 270.
100
See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (returning to the question of subject matter eligibility in a software case).
101
See Dolmage, supra note 99, at 1030–35; Fisher, supra note 22, at 270 (explaining that,
after Diehr, “the Federal Circuit . . . adopted an increasingly receptive posture” toward considering software to be patentable).
102
See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245–47 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (“Determination
of whether a claim preempts nonstatutory subject matter as a whole . . . requires a two-step
analysis. First, it must be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly recites an ‘algorithm’ . . . . Second, the claim must be further analyzed to ascertain whether in its entirety it
wholly preempts that algorithm.”); see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“This test, in its final form, had two steps: (1) determining whether the claim recites an ‘algorithm’ within the meaning of Benson, then (2) determining whether that algorithm is ‘applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps.’ ” (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d
at 95–107)), aff’d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
103
See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544–45 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
104
Id. at 1526.
105
See id. at 1537.
106
See id. at 1543, 1543 n.20 (“A close analysis of Diehr, Flook, and Benson reveals that the
Supreme Court never intended to create an overly broad, fourth category of subject matter
excluded from § 101.”).
107
Id. at 1542 (emphasis added).
108
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
109
Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), and H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6
(1952)); see In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1542 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309).
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“a rather straightforward concept, namely, that certain types of mathematical
subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until
reduced to some type of practical application, and thus that subject matter is
not, in and of itself, entitled to patent protection.”110 Although a claim
consisting entirely of a mathematical algorithm is unpatentable, an invention is
not unpatentable simply because it contains such an algorithm, the court
explained.111 If a claim includes something more than just an algorithm or other
vague mathematical concept, then it would not be subject to the exceptions
outlined in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.112 With respect to the invention at issue
in In re Alappat, the court explained that the combination of elements
“form[ed] a machine for converting discrete waveform data samples into antialiased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display means.”113
“This,” the court explained, was “not a disembodied mathematical concept
which may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine
to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”114 Accordingly, it
constituted, patentable subject matter.115 In other words, when the inventor
claimed the algorithm in conjunction with a computer so that it could be
applied in a practical way, the invention constitued a patentable “machine”
under § 101.116
The Federal Circuit continued welcoming software into the world of
patentability when it decided State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc.117 and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.118 a
110
111

In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
See id. at 1543–44. The court stated:
It is . . . not necessary to determine whether a claim contains, as merely a part of the whole, any
mathematical subject matter which standing alone would not be entitled to patent protection. Indeed, because the dispositive inquiry is whether the claim as a whole is directed to statutory subject matter, it is irrelevant that a claim may contain, as part of the whole, subject matter which
would not be patentable by itself. “A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, mathematical equation,
mathematical algorithm, computer program or digital computer.”

Id. (emphasis, alterations, and footnote omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
187 (1981)).
112
See id. at 1544.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
See id. at 1544–45.
116
See id. (stating that “a computer operating pursuant to software may represent patentable
subject matter, provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter meets all of the other requirements of Title 35” and finding that the claimed invention did not constitute “a disembodied mathematical concept which may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a
specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result”); Steger, supra note 73,
at 50. As Steven Steger explained, “[a] software program running on a general purpose computer creates a new machine because the general purpose computer becomes a special purpose computer when performing according to instructions received from the program.” Id.
117
State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc.,149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
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few years later. In these cases, the Federal Circuit made clear that software
does indeed constitute patentable subject matter. In State Street, the court
explained that only abstract, “disembodied” mathematical algorithms fall into
the algorithm exception to patentability.119 When a computer transforms data
through mathematical formulas and techniques and produces “a useful,
concrete and tangible result,” the exception does not apply.120 In AT&T, the
court doubled down, reiterating that the “inquiry . . . focuses on whether the
mathematical algorithm is applied in a practical manner to produce a useful
result.”121 More explicitly, the court explained that it was “now clear that
computer-based programming constitutes patentable subject matter so long as
the basic requirements of § 101 are met.”122 The Federal Circuit could not have
been clearer, and this line of cases established stable footing for the
patentability of computer software. In fact, following these cases, it was
understood that “virtually any software program (if novel, nonobvious, etc.)
[was] patentable, so long as the applicant describe[d] it as being programmed
into a general purpose computer.”123 Perhaps not unexpectedly, these decisions
resulted in “an enormous surge in software patent applications.”124
C. From Patents to Trade Secrets
Beginning in 2010, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases drastically
shrinking the area of patentable subject matter. In Bilski v. Kappos,125 the Court
assessed the patentability of a method for hedging risk—a common economic
practice in industry.126 The Court’s confusing127 opinion first explained that the
“machine-or-transformation” test as articulated in Benson cannot be the sole
test for assessing whether something constitutes a “process” under § 101;128 in118

AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 149 F.3d at 1373–75.
120
Id. at 1373.
121
AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1360.
122
Id.
123
Fisher, supra note 22, at 270; see also Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise
of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-out” Programs, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1153–63 (1995) (“In effect, then, Alappat establishes that a mathematical
algorithm becomes patentable subject matter merely by virtue of its being programmed into
a general purpose computer.”).
124
Fisher, supra note 22, at 270.
125
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
126
See id. at 611.
127
See Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the
Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1304 (2011) (suggesting that
the Bilski opinion is confusing); see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 647 n.43 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the Bilski majority “illogically expanded the canon upon which it relie[d]
beyond that canon’s logical underpinnings”).
128
See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 603 (“Adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test
for what constitutes a ‘process’ . . . violates . . . statutory interpretation principles.”).
119
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stead, it is just “a useful and important clue” as to whether the invention in
question is a process.129 Still, the Court concluded that the method was not a
patentable “process” under § 101 because it was an “abstract idea”—falling
under the § 101 exception to patentable subject matter.130
Two years later, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,131 the Court again addressed the categorical exceptions to § 101—
“[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”132 It examined the
patentability of “[a] method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of
an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,” which included “administering
a drug[,] . . . determining the level of [the drug in the patient],” and assessing
whether the drug level is too high or low based on the inventors’ research findings.133 The Court determined that the method “set forth laws of nature—
namely, relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the
blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a . . . drug will prove ineffective or
cause harm.”134 And the claimed “steps [were] not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those regularities.”135 In reaching this conclusion, the Court took a tour through the Court’s
§ 101 exception cases, including Benson, Flook, Diehr, and Bilski.136 Notably,
the Prometheus Court explained that, in Benson, the Court had “held that simply implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely, a
computer, was not a patentable application of that principle. For the mathematical formula had ‘no substantial practical application except in connection with
a digital computer.’ ”137

129

See id. at 604 (“This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or-transformation test
is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed
inventions are processes under § 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’ ”). The Court further explained that business methods are not categorically unpatentable under § 101. See id. at 606
(“Section 101 . . . precludes the broad contention that the term ‘process’ categorically excludes business methods.”).
130
See id. at 609.
131
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
132
Id. at 70 (alterations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
133
Id. at 74–75.
134
Id. at 77.
135
Id. at 80.
136
See id. at 70–73, 78–82, 85.
137
Id. at 84–85 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)). The next year, in
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013), the
Court found that “a naturally occurring segment of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)” that was
“isolate[ed] from the rest of the genome” was not patentable because it was a naturally occurring phenomenon but that “synthetically created . . . complementary DNA . . . which contains the same protein-coding information found in a segment of natural DNA but omits portions within the DNA segment that do not code for proteins” was patentable under § 101. Id.
at 580.
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Finally, in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, the Court applied these
revitalizations of the § 101 exception to computer software.138 As the Court explained, “[t]he patents at issue in th[e] case disclose[d] a computerimplemented scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ (i.e., the risk that only one
party to a financial transaction will pay what it owes) by using a third-party intermediary.”139 The Alice Court clarified the approach it set out earlier in Prometheus, examining, first, whether the inventor’s claim was “directed to one of
th[e] patent-ineligible concepts” such as algorithms and, second, whether the
combination of claims transformed the invention “into a patent-eligible
application”—whether there was an “inventive concept.”140 This approach is
again based on the concern of placing a monopoly on a basic principle and
stunting innovation.141 Then, relying heavily on Prometheus and Bilski, the
Court concluded that the claims were “drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation
fail[ed] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”142 More
specifically, the Court stated that “[t]he introduction of a computer into the
claims does not alter the analysis . . . .”143 Quoting Prometheus, it reiterated:
“[S]imply implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine,
namely a computer, is not a patentable application of that principle.”144 And the
Court went even further:
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’ ” is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the
use of an abstract idea “to a particular technological environment.” Stating an
abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to “implement” an abstract idea
“on a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion
accords with the pre-emption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence.
Given the ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation is
not generally the sort of “additional feature” that provides any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
abstract idea itself.”145

In short, the application of algorithms through the use of computer software
generally constitutes unpatentable subject matter. The claimed invention must

138

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014).
Id.
140
Id. at 217 (quoting Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. at 72–73).
141
See id. at 216 (“We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as
one of pre-emption.”); supra text accompanying note 81.
142
Alice, 573 U.S. at 212, 218–19, 221.
143
Id. at 222.
144
Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 84 (2012)).
145
Id. at 223–24 (alterations and citations omitted) (quoting Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566
U.S. at 72, 77, 84, and Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010)).
139
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“do more than simply . . . implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.”146
These decisions shook the patent law community and the software industry. They have made it tremendously more difficult for inventors, and in particular software developers, to obtain patents. Within two years, it was estimated
that the PTO had rejected around 60,000 patent applications due to Alice, and
prosecutors had abandoned about 8,400 applications.147
The Court’s recent § 101 decisions have also made existing patents more
vulnerable to invalidation, as decisions like Alice retroactively affect patents
that have already issued.148 In fact, two years after the Court decided Alice, federal courts saw a 400% increase in the number of § 101 cases they decided, and
about 70% of these cases resulted in patent invalidation.149 This has pushed
software developers away from trying to protect their inventions through patents.150
Even beyond shrinking patentable subject matter, the Court has decided
other patent cases resulting in making patent protection less desirable for software developers. It has heightened the non-obviousness requirement by shifting
146

Id. at 225. Since Alice was decided, lower courts have limited the case’s reach, finding
something of a middle ground between Alice and its predecessors. See, e.g., Cardionet, LLC
v. Infobionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
147
See Robert Sachs, Two Years After Alice: The Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case”
(Part 2), BILSKI BLOG (June 20, 2016), https://www.bilskiblog.com/2016/06/two-years-afteralice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case-part-2/#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/MRJ5-23Z8]
(explaining published data shows that 36,000 applications had been rejected based on Alice
and that 5,000 applications had been abandoned but that, because published applications ordinarily account for only 60% of applications, the numbers are likely much higher); see also
ANDREW A. TOOLE & NICHOLAS A. PAIROLERO, ADJUSTING TO ALICE: USPTO PATENT
EXAMINATION OUTCOMES AFTER ALICE CORP. V. CLS BANK INTERNATIONAL 3 (2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCE-DH_AdjustingtoAlice.pdf [https://
perma.cc/72SA-SBWL] (“For Alice-affected technologies, the chances of receiving a first
office action rejection with a rejection for patent-ineligible subject matter increased by 31%
in the 18 months following Alice.”). The PTO has worked to mitigate this “Alice Effect,”
and, a year after issuing further guidance on subject matter eligibility in January of 2019,
“the chances of receiving a first office action rejection for patent-ineligible subject matter
[had decreased] by 25% for Alice-affected technologies.” See id. at 6.
148
According to one author: “It is difficult to understate the impact of the Supreme Court’s
decisions involving [patentable subject matter under] Section 101. Thousands of patents likely became invalid after these decisions, essentially rendering them worthless at best.” Hricik,
supra note 36, at 470–71 (footnote omitted).
149
See Robert Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case”
(Part 1), BILSKI BLOG (June 16, 2016), https://www.bilskiblog.com/2016/06/two-years-afteralice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case/ [https://perma.cc/EM83-QNSH].
150
Measuring the extent of this Alice phenomenon is difficult because, in the midst of our
“Fourth Industrial Revolution,” the software industry continues to boom, and an increasing
number of software patents are being issued. Raymond Millien, Six Years After Alice: 61.8%
of U.S. Patents Issued in 2019 Were ‘Software-Related’—Up 21.6% from 2018,
IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/02/17/six-years-alice-618-u-s-patents-issued-2019-software-related-21-6-2018/id=118986/ [https://perma.cc/BCE9-T
AVP].
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its analysis from a focus on piecing together prior art to one focused instead on
common sense, market demand, or design trends.151 It has also bolstered the
definiteness requirement.152 The Court has made it more difficult for patent
holders to establish infringement by narrowing the doctrine of equivalents,153
limiting the circumstances under which infringement can occur outside of U.S.
borders,154 making it more difficult for a patent holder to establish liability for
one who induced another party to infringe,155 and expanding the conditions under which a patentee has “exhausted” his patent rights such that he cannot establish liability against the relevant user.156 The Court has also made patent defense tougher by increasing the number of individuals and entities that can
work to invalidate a patent,157 limiting venue shopping among patent holders,158
making it easier for patent challengers to be awarded attorneys’ fees from the
patentee’s purse,159 and making it more difficult for patentees to obtain injunc151

See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“When there is a design
need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options
within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.”); see also Hricik, supra note
36, at 471–72 (suggesting that this change deters inventors from seeking patent protection).
152
See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (“In place of
the ‘insolubly ambiguous’ standard, we hold that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its
claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history,
fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.”); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 472 (indicating that this change makes it more difficult to patent inventions).
153
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 726–27, 741
(2002) (“While estoppel does not effect a complete bar, the question remains whether petitioner can demonstrate that the narrowing amendments did not surrender the particular
equivalents at issue.”); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 473–75.
154
See Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 737 (2017); Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441–42 (2007); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 477–78.
155
See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 917 (2014) (explaining that “a defendant may [not] be liable for inducing infringement of a patent under 35
U.S.C. § 271(b) when no one has directly infringed the patent under § 271(a) or any other
statutory provision”); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011)
(“Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge
that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.”); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 476.
But see Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015) (“The question
the Court confronts today concerns whether a defendant’s belief regarding patent validity is
a defense to a claim of induced infringement. It is not.”).
156
See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017); Quanta
Comput. Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at
478–80.
157
See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 480–81.
158
See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517, 1520–21
(2017); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 481–82.
159
See Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755–56
(2014); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 482–84 (explaining the significance of the Octane
Fitness decision in dissuading parties from obtaining patents).
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tive relief even after they have established infringement.160 Finally, the Court
has made it easier to challenge patent validity by creating new, post-grant administrative proceedings within the PTO.161 Such proceedings are significantly
less expensive and generally more effective in invalidating a patent than challenging validity in the courts.162
While the Court has been making patent protection more onerous for software developers, Congress has been working to make trade secret protection
somewhat easier. One historical disadvantage of trade secret law is that it was
rooted in state law and thus varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.163 In 2016,
though, Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act, which for the first time
created a federal private cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.164
The recent provision of federal protection makes trade secret protection more
desirable. Further, the new federal law expanded trade secret protection beyond
the limits that states were providing.165 This has made trade secret law an even
more valuable source of information protection.
160

See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see also Hricik, supra
note 36, at 485–86.
161
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(amending various parts of Title 35); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 489.
162
See Hricik, supra note 36, at 489–90 (“Post-grant proceedings are substantially less expensive than defending a patent suit. In addition, three features common to each proceeding,
separately and together, make it demonstrably more likely that patents can be successfully
challenged under these new post-grant proceedings than is the case in litigation.” (footnote
omitted)). When challenging patent validity in the district courts, a presumption of validity
(clear and convincing evidence) applies, whereas a determination of invalidity in a postgrant proceeding is based on just a preponderance of the evidence. See id. Additionally,
claims are viewed more broadly in post-grant proceedings than in court, increasing the likelihood of an invalidity determination. See id. Finally, a court may stay a patentee’s infringement lawsuit if the defendant can convince the PTO that there is a reasonable likelihood that
one of the patent claims is invalid. See id.
163
See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2–3 (2016) (explaining that the differences between state
laws can be significant, potentially affecting “which party has the burden of establishing that
a trade secret is not readily ascertainable, whether the owner has any rights against a party
that innocently acquires a trade secret, the scope of information protectable as trade secret,
and what measures are necessary to satisfy the requirement that the owner employ ‘reasonable measures’ to maintain secrecy of the information”); Explaining the Defend Trade Secrets
Act, BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/pub
lications/blt/2016/09/03_cohen/ [https://perma.cc/3PNV-39VZ] (“Before the enactment of
the DTSA, . . . companies seeking redress for trade-secret misappropriation [often] had no
choice but to sue in state court, where laws protecting against trade-secret misappropriation
tend to differ from state to state both in the text of the laws themselves and in their application.”). But see S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2–3 (2016) (explaining that the UTSA “has been
adopted (in its entirety or with some modifications) in 47 States and the District of Columbia” and noting that “the differences between State laws and the UTSA are generally relatively minor”).
164
See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376.
165
Not only does the DTSA define “trade secret” more broadly than the UTSA, see Joseph
D. Mornin, What You Need to Know About the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 28 INTELL. PROP.
& TECH. L.J. 20, 21 (2016) (“The DTSA definition of ‘trade secret’ is broader than the UTSA
definition.”), but it also, for example, “allows ex parte seizures of misappropriated trade se-

21 NEV. L.J. 61

Fall 2020]

SECRET ALGORITHMS

87

All of these changes in IP law have pushed software developers deeper into
the world of trade secrets.166 If patents are more difficult to obtain and easier to
invalidate, the trade-off of disclosing your inventions in exchange for a twentyyear much-more-limited patent is less worthwhile.
II. PRIVATE ALGORITHMS, PUBLIC INTERESTS
In the wake of these movements in IP law, trade secret law has emerged as
a useful means of software protection. It is debatable whether the resulting
broad secrecy surrounding valuable software could spur or quell competition
within the industry and serve as a boon or bust to consumers. Within particular
pockets of public law, though, this secrecy has created significant public policy,
statutory, and even constitutional concerns. These serious issues arise from
several potential shortcomings of algorithms that secrecy can mask. First is the
problem of inaccuracy. This could result in travesties such as defendants being
convicted and deprived of their liberty or lives based on erroneous machine
outputs.167 Another potential problem of algorithms is bias. This could mean
that an individual is deprived of fair treatment in housing, employment, or even
services because of algorithmic injustice.168 A third concern is security. In the
realm of voting, for example, secrecy masking the security or insecurity of
electronic voting machines could result in undermining democracy.169
Overall, the broad secrecy resulting in part from recent changes in IP law
has created significant concerns. Secret algorithms used in areas that affect the
public interest are particularly problematic. Issues are already arising in a
whole host of contexts, including criminal justice, housing, and voting.
A. Criminal Justice
Secret algorithms are starting to play a major role in the world of criminal
justice. Police officers, judges, lawyers, and forensic scientists are making use
of new science– and technology–based algorithms to measure blood-alcohol
levels, match fingerprints, predict recidivism for bail and sentencing purposes,
improve policing, and gather and act on other data.170 Some advantages of relying on algorithms in these contexts is that they offer the potential to provide
greater fairness to defendants across cases and remove judicial and other concrets.” Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Explaining the Defend Trade Secrets Act, supra note
163 (“One provision of the new DTSA that has generated much commentary in the run up to
its enactment is the new civil seizure mechanism established by the statute.”).
166
See 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 9, at § 9.02 (“Perhaps an example of unintended
consequences, the [America Invents Act’s] prior user rights provision may, in some circumstances, militate in favor of keeping an invention as a trade secret rather than seeking patent
protection.”).
167
See infra Section II.A.
168
See infra Section II.B.
169
See infra Section II.C.
170
See Ryan, supra note 12, at 277–78, 292–93.
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scious and unconscious biases from criminal justice decisionmaking.171 They
also may lend greater efficiency to the criminal justice system.172
Despite these advantages of the purported evidence-based approach that
these algorithms offer, there are real questions about the accuracy of these algorithms. For example, in a 2016 study of COMPAS—an algorithm-based program used to predict recidivism for criminal justice decisionmaking—
ProPublica found the program to be only “somewhat more accurate than a coin
flip.”173 And even more concerning than the accuracy of prediction programs
like COMPAS are the questions about the accuracy of “conviction programs”174—programs that criminal justice actors use to actually determine the
guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant.175 Prosecutors regularly present evidence in court based on the secret algorithms embedded in breathalyzers, automated fingerprint identification systems, and probabilistic genotyping systems.176 Judges ordinarily readily admit these computer outputs into evidence,
and judges and jurors often eagerly convict defendants based on this evidence.177 All of this could lead to a long term of imprisonment or even death for
the defendant.178 Yet, the true accuracy of these tools often remains unknown.179 When defendants have requested access to the underlying source
codes and algorithms powering these programs and producing their outputs,
judges have ordinarily denied their requests.180 Yet, on occasion, the public has
gotten a glimpse into the potential inaccuracies propagated by these secret programs.181 For example, in one case out of New York, two rival probabilistic
genotyping systems—TrueAllele and STRmix—were used to determine

171

See id. at 281–87.
See id. at 286.
173
See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propu
blica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/8G
DM-X55C].
174
Ryan, supra note 12, at 270.
175
See id. at 293 (explaining that “more is simply at stake when the question is one of innocence rather than one of temporary pretrial confinement or punishment for those already determined guilty”).
176
See id. at 292–93.
177
See id.
178
See id. at 272 (“Yet even more is at stake—a defendant's liberty or even his life—where
conviction programs are involved.”).
179
See id. at 303 (“Although much is at stake where convictions are involved, and although
prosecutors regularly present evidence produced by conviction programs as nearly indisputable, there are real questions about the accuracy of the outputs that these conviction programs produce and that prosecutors rely on so heavily today.”); cf. PASQUALE, supra note 31,
at 14–15 (“Although internet giants say their algorithms are scientific and neutral tools, it is
very difficult to verify those claims. And while they have become critical economic infrastructure, trade secrecy law permits managers to hide their methodologies, and business
practices, deflecting scrutiny.” (footnote omitted)).
180
See Ryan, supra note 12, at 305–23.
181
See id. at 310, 316.
172
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whether the DNA found at a murder scene matched the defendant’s DNA.182
The two programs produced contradictory results, indicating that one of them
had to be incorrect.183 And errors are not limited to new technologies like probabilistic genotyping systems. When experts examined breathalyzer source code
that a judge (anomalously) ordered released in New Jersey, they discovered algorithmic errors leading to erroneous blood-alcohol concentration outputs that
had been regularly used in criminal cases.184
Beyond this striking inaccuracy concern, algorithm-based programs also
raise questions of bias—that these algorithms unjustly discriminate against certain groups of people.185 For example, the ProPublica study noting the unreliability of COMPAS’s recidivism predictions also exposed some of the biases
embedded in the algorithm’s outcomes.186 Specifically, ProPublica explained
that the program “turned up significant racial disparities.”187 In predicting recidivism, “[t]he formula was particularly likely to falsely flag black defendants
as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate as
white defendants. . . . White defendants were mislabeled as low risk more often
than black defendants.”188 Even after accounting for criminal history, type of
182

See Seth Augenstein, Subjective DNA Mixture Analysis, Used in Thousands of Cases,
Blasted by WH Panel, FORENSIC MAG. (Sept. 8, 2016, 12:37 PM), https://forensicresources.o
rg/articles/subjective-dna-mixture-analysis-used-in-thousands-of-cases-blasted-by-wh-panel/
[https://perma.cc/E4XB-72B9].
183
See id.
184
See State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 157 (N.J. 2008) (explaining that one “expert . . . identified a significant flaw in the [breathalyzer] program’s source code that, in limited circumstances, can lead to an inaccurate reported BAC test result” and that, although an
opposing expert “disputed many of the conclusions proffered by defendants’ experts, . . . he
acknowledged and explained the buffer overflow defect, admitting that he was responsible
for the inclusion of this error in the code”); see also State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677,
685 (Minn. 2009) (noting the appellant’s report, which “analyzed the New Jersey machine’s
computer source code and uncovered a variety of defects that could impact the test result”).
185
One of the draws of relying on algorithms is that they have a reputation of being more
objective than humans, and in that sense they provide promise for shedding bias in important
decisionmaking. See supra text accompanying note 171. But algorithms can also be biased.
Sometimes the bias is baked in through biased computer programmers or bad data. See
Rumman Chowdhury & Narendra Mulani, Auditing Algorithms for Bias, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Oct. 24, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/10/auditing-algorithms-for-bias [https://perma.cc/QDQ
8-ESRV]. Rumman Chowdhury and Narendra Mulani have questioned:
Can AI provide the veil of ignorance that would lead us to objective and ideal outcomes? . . . The answer so far has been disappointing. However objective we may intend our
technology to be, it is ultimately influenced by the people who build it and the data that feeds it.
Technologists do not define the objective functions behind AI independent of social context. Data is not objective, is it [sic] reflective of pre-existing social and cultural biases. In practice, AI
can be a method of perpetuating bias, leading to unintended negative consequences and inequitable outcomes.

Id. Complementing this baked-in bias, sometimes algorithm results create a disparate impact
on minorities simply because of the particular factors used to assess the issue in question.
186
Angwin et al., supra note 173.
187
Id.
188
Id.
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crime, race, and gender, ProPublica found that “[b]lack defendants were still 77
percent more likely to be pegged as at higher risk of committing a future violent crime and 45 percent more likely to be predicted to commit a future crime
of any kind.”189 In other words, the algorithm was biased.190
Another prediction algorithm used within the criminal justice system is
PredPol—software developed for police departments that allows police officers
to concentrate their limited resources in areas that are probabilistically most
likely to see future crime.191 This software also comes with concerns about biases. Some commentators have characterized it as discriminatory in nature, because PredPol’s outputs generally direct law enforcement to police poor, minority neighborhoods more closely than other neighborhoods.192
Despite this evidence of inaccuracies and biases in both prediction and
conviction programs, the true extent of these issues remains veiled by the secrecy enveloping these programs.193 Often the developers of these algorithms
are private, for-profit entities, and they understandably want to maintain their
monopoly over the programs to amass the greatest returns on their investments.194 As such, these developers claim trade secret protection over their programs, and judges have generally upheld these claims.195 Perhaps surprisingly,
even the police officers, forensic scientists, and other experts who use and rely
189

Id.
The picture is actually more complicated, though. Northpointe, “the company that developed COMPAS,” and several criminologists disputed this conclusion. See Matthias
Spielkamp, Inspecting Algorithms for Bias, MIT TECH. REV. (June 12, 2017), https://www.te
chnologyreview.com/2017/06/12/105804/inspecting-algorithms-for-bias/ [https://perma.cc/F
A53-ZJPA]. And, in fact, whether the algorithm is fair depends upon how you measure fairness. See id. Cathy O’Neil has asserted that, although “the COMPAS scoring system is wellcalibrated,” it was unfair. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 224 (2016).
“[T]he percentage of high-risk scores among blacks and among whites matches the actual
rate of recidivism among blacks and among whites[,]” but ProPublica “found there were
twice as many false positives for blacks as for whites, and twice as many false negatives for
whites as for blacks.” Id.
191
See PREDPOL, https://www.predpol.com/ [https://perma.cc/9XZN-VM2A]; see also
O’NEIL, supra note 190, at 85 (“Predictive programs like PredPol are all the rage in budgetstrapped police departments across the country.”).
192
See Jack Smith, IV, Crime-Prediction Tool May Be Reinforcing Discriminatory Policing,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2016, 4:02 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/predictivepolicing-discriminatory-police-crime-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/94J7-8KXG]; see also Jamie
Grierson, Predictive Policing Poses Discrimination Risk, Thinktank Warns, GUARDIAN (Sept.
15, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/sep/16/predictive-policingposes-discrimination-risk-thinktank-warns [https://perma.cc/3Q5G-CFA7] (“Predictive policing—the use of machine-learning algorithms to fight crime—risks unfairly discriminating
against protected characteristics including race, sexuality and age, a security thinktank has
warned.”).
193
See Ryan, supra note 12, at 304–05.
194
See id. at 324 (“One of the reasons that these algorithms and source codes are kept secret
is that outside companies have created them and rely on this secrecy to make profits; the algorithms and source codes are proprietary in nature.”).
195
See id. at 304–23.
190
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on these programs are not privy to their algorithms.196 The government may
have asked for validation information upon purchasing or licensing the programs, but there often has been no thorough, independent review of the instruments producing outputs that could affect the fates of criminal defendants.197
This is just astounding.
The secrecy surrounding these algorithms that affect the dispositions of
criminal cases and criminal defendants’ futures goes beyond shocking and may
even amount to constitutional violations.198 Under the Supreme Court’s revitalization of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington199 and its progeny,200 denying criminal defendants access to evidence that the prosecution is
relying on for convictions could constitute a Sixth Amendment violation.201
Even if a forensic scientist conducts a probabilistic genotyping system test on a
DNA sample and the defense has the opportunity to cross-examine the forensic
scientist about the report, because the forensic scientist has little to no
knowledge about how the probabilistic genotyping system functions, this crossexamination may not be very useful to the defense.202 Instead, one could say
that the Confrontation Clause requires that the defense has the opportunity to
cross-examine the developer of the algorithm or have access to the algorithm
itself.203 Intertwined with this Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause argument is the concern that allowing judges and juries to base convictions on the
prosecution’s presentation of secret evidence amounts to a Due Process violation as well.204 Among many other things, the Due Process Clause requires that
criminal defendants have a “fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.”205 This right even includes providing defendants with the necessary
196

See id. at 294, 297–98.
See id. at 295 (“In reality, though, there may be insufficient research or validation studies
propping up many of these programs or the algorithms and source codes on which they are
built.”).
198
See id. at 329–41. In addition to the Confrontation Clause and Due Process arguments I
discuss here, convicting criminal defendants based on secret evidence also raises concerns
about constitutional violations under the disclosure requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny. See Ryan, supra note 12, at 339–40.
199
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
200
See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 657–58 (2011) (requiring that the
forensic examiner conducting forensic tests later presented in court must be the same individual that the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine about the report); MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–11 (2009) (determining that a forensic report is
“testimonial” such that the Confrontation Clause requirements apply and thus requiring that
the defendant have the opportunity to cross-examine the expert about the report).
201
See Ryan, supra note 12, at 334–38 (“Defendants’ inabilities to gain access to information that may be essential to presenting a complete defense thus poses a significant constitutional concern under both the Due Process Clauses and the Confrontation Clause.”).
202
See id. at 336–37.
203
See id.
204
See id. at 329–41.
205
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); see also Holmes v. South Carolina,
547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Four197
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financial resources to do so.206 Denying defendants access to the details of the
evidence presented against them robs them of this fair opportunity.207
Overall, in the world of criminal justice, relying on algorithms to dole out
more uniform justice certainly has its benefits—and its proponents—but it also
creates some concerns that are tied to the lack of transparency involved in relying on these algorithms. When the price of relying on algorithms in this context
is a potential violation of important constitutional rights, it raises the questions
of whether we should really be using algorithms in this way and, if we do,
whether we can make uses of them more transparent to avoid these constitutional concerns.
B. Housing
There are also secret algorithms at play in the housing context that similarly raise serious concerns—particularly with respect to bias. Algorithm-created
bias is a phenomenon across fields, but algorithmic bias in the context of the
basic human right to housing208 is especially troubling.
Discrimination in housing has a long history in this country.209 Landlords
historically turned away Blacks who sought to lease their properties, neighborhood associations refused to let Blacks move into the area, banks refused to offer mortgages to minorities, and the federal government refused to insure any

teenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.’ ” (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986))).
206
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1985) (reiterating that “mere access to the
courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process” and
explaining that “a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the
building of an effective defense”).
207
See Ryan, supra note 12, at 335 (“Defendants’ inabilities to gain access to information
that may be essential to presenting a complete defense thus poses a significant constitutional
concern under both the Due Process Clauses and the Confrontation Clause.”).
208
See Carlie Armstrong, Slow Progress: New Federal Rules Only Begin to Address Housing Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 9 MOD. AM., Summer
2013, at 2, 3 (explaining that Congress has expanded the Fair Housing Act because of “a
growing recognition of housing as a fundamental human right”); Miles Walser, Note, Putting
the Brakes on Rent Increases: How the United States Could Implement German AntiGentrification Laws Without Running Afoul of the Takings Clause, 36 WIS. INT’L L.J. 186,
209–10 (2019) (“In the United States, the human right to housing is, thanks in part to housing rights activists, arguably a part of these baseline values, even if not yet formally recognized.”).
209
See Olga Khazan, Being Black in America Can Be Hazardous to Your Health, ATLANTIC
(Jul./Aug. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/being-black-inamerica-can-be-hazardous-to-your-health/561740/ [https://perma.cc/TM64-EEB5]; see also
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 17–18, 20, 22, 27, 34, 36 (2017).
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minorities who were successful in obtaining mortgages.210 In 1968, Congress
passed the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits discrimination in housing on the
basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”211 Despite
this action, discrimination in housing remains a persistent, pernicious problem.
It may not be as widespread or obvious as it once was, but evidence suggests
that individuals and corporations continue to discriminate against minorities—
whether intentionally or unintentionally—on a regular basis.
Today, discrimination in housing is often masked by secret algorithms protected by company trade secrets. Still, some limited investigations have found
evidence of such discrimination. For example, following an in-depth study of
algorithmic discrimination,212 in March 2019, the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) filed suit against Facebook for allowing advertisers to discriminate in their housing advertisements on the Facebook platform
and also for Facebook’s own discrimination in using an algorithm that shows
advertisements to only particular users based upon the users’ characteristics,
including proxies for race.213
210

See Khazan, supra note 209; see also, e.g., Jonathan Mahler & Steve Eder, ‘No Vacancies’ for Blacks: How Donald Trump Got His Start, and Was First Accused of Bias, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/us/politics/donald-trump-housi
ng-race.html [https://perma.cc/3GRJ-MQW6] (relating how Trump Management has a history of discriminating against Blacks).
211
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1974). The categories of sex, disability, and familial status were added
in later amendments to the Act. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-430, 102 Stat. 1619; Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-383, 88 Stat. 633.
212
See Julia Angwin et al., Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude Users by
Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebookadvertising-discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin [https://perma.cc/K3WQ-33F8];
Julia Angwin & Terry Parris, Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-letsadvertisers-exclude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/8J43-B4CK]; see also Ariana Tobin,
HUD Sues Facebook Over Housing Discrimination and Says the Company’s Algorithms
Have Made the Problem Worse, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 28, 2019, 1:18 PM), https://www.propub
lica.org/article/hud-sues-facebook-housing-discrimination-advertising-algorithms [https://per
ma.cc/U5M6-WYNJ] (“ProPublica first reported in 2016 that Facebook allowed housing
advertisers to exclude users by race. Then in 2017, ProPublica found that—despite Facebook’s promised changes—the company was still letting advertisers exclude users by race,
gender, ethnicity, family status, ability and other characteristics.”).
213
See Charge of Discrimination at 4–6, Sec’y of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Facebook, Inc.,
(Mar. 28, 2019) (FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8), https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documen
ts/HUD_v_Facebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/H25U-99LA]; Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin,
HUD Is Reviewing Twitter’s and Google’s Ad Practices as Part of Housing Discrimination
Probe, WASH. POST, (Mar. 28, 2019, 3:59 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2
019/03/28/hud-charges-facebook-with-housing-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/9Q5D-Z3W
X]. Shortly before HUD filed the complaint, Facebook was working with HUD to reform its
practices. Tobin, supra note 212. But HUD filed this complaint even “after Facebook announced sweeping changes to its advertising portal, preventing landlords, employers and
lenders from discriminating in housing, employment or credit ads.” Id. A Facebook spokesman “said a breakdown occurred when the government asked for total and unfettered access
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With respect to allowing the advertisers, themselves, to discriminate on the
Facebook platform, HUD alleged the following:
Respondent [Facebook] has provided a toggle button that enables advertisers to
exclude men or women from seeing an ad, a search-box to exclude people who
do not speak a specific language from seeing an ad, and a map tool to exclude
people who live in a specified area from seeing an ad by drawing a red line
around that area. Respondent also provides drop-down menus and search boxes
to exclude or include (i.e., limit the audience of an ad exclusively to) people who
share specified attributes. Respondent has offered advertisers hundreds of thousands of attributes from which to choose, for example to exclude “women in the
workforce,” “moms of grade school kids,” “foreigners,” “Puerto Rico Islanders,”
or people interested in “parenting,” “accessibility,” “service animal,” “Hijab
Fashion,” or “Hispanic Culture.” Respondent also has offered advertisers the
ability to limit the audience of an ad by selecting to include only those classified
as, for example, “Christian” or “Childfree.”214

Beyond that, Facebook also allows advertisers to select “Custom Audiences”
and “Lookalike Audiences,” which empowers the advertiser to target a specific
list of users to view the advertisement, choose the viewers based on users’ interactions with the advertisers’ other content, or select viewers based on the
characteristics they share with the advertisers’ existing customers.215
Even aside from discrimination resulting from advertisers’ selections of
audiences, HUD alleged that Facebook’s proprietary algorithm, itself, discriminated in violation of the Fair Housing Act.216 According to HUD:
During . . . the ad delivery phase, Respondent selects from among the users eligible to see an ad which users will actually see it. Respondent bases this decision
in large part on the inferences and predictions it draws about each user’s likelihood to respond to an ad based on the data it has about that user, the data it has
about other users whom it considers to resemble that user, and the data it has
about “friends” and other associates of that user. To decide which users will see
an ad, Respondent considers sex and close proxies for the other protected classes. Such proxies can include which pages a user visits, which apps a user has,
to the company’s user base, a request the social media giant denied because it would have set
a dangerous precedent.” Jan & Dwoskin, supra. The Washington Post Editorial Board has
cautioned that we ought to be wary of the motives behind the lawsuit. See Ed. Bd., Discrimination on Facebook Is a Real Problem. But Carson’s Motives Warrant Skepticism, WASH.
POST (Mar. 31, 2019, 1:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/discriminationon-facebook-is-a-real-problem-but-carsons-motives-warrant-skepticism/2019/03/31/0c28fd6
e-524f-11e9-8d28-f5149e5a2fda_story.html [https://perma.cc/6CSM-3SUE] (“[S]ome skepticism is warranted.”). It notes that, “as a matter of policy, the housing department under this
administration has seemed more interested in dismantling housing protections than ensuring
they are respected” and suggests that Secretary Carson’s actions likely stem from the general
sentiment by Republicans and the White House that tech companies are biased against rightwing politicians and ideas. Id. The Board suggests that this could be just one more attack on
tech companies, and that a crack-down on discrimination in housing “may be happening for
the wrong reason.” Id.
214
Charge of Discrimination, supra note 213, at para. 14.
215
See id. at para. 15–16.
216
See id. at para. 17.
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where a user goes during the day, and the purchases a user makes on and offline.
Respondent alone, not the advertiser, determines which users will constitute the
“actual audience” for each ad.217

HUD Secretary Ben Carson explained that “[u]sing a computer to limit a person’s housing choices can be just as discriminatory as slamming a door in
someone’s face.”218 Commentators have characterized Facebook’s practices as
“massively illegal [and] . . . as blatant a violation of the federal Fair Housing
Act as one can find.”219 They have also characterized these practices as a blatant violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.220
Facebook’s tactics are not unique. Twitter and Google, for example, use
similar algorithms to target advertisements, and their conduct has also been under review by HUD.221 As one reporter noted, “[t]he [Facebook] case is likely
to have ripple effects throughout the tech industry, which considers targeting
advertising to be standard practice and has historically enjoyed immunity from
prosecution when third parties commit abuses on their platforms.”222
Targeted advertising is not the only area in which reliance on algorithms
has contributed to the already existing problem of discrimination in housing.
For example, a 2019 study uncovered biases against minorities in the algorithms mortgage companies rely on in determining how much interest to charge
mortgagees.223 According to the study, mortgage companies relying on algorithms regularly set mortgage purchase prices higher for African American and
Latinx mortgagees than Caucasian mortgagees to the tune of more than five additional basis points.224 This costs these minority groups about an extra $250–
$500 million each year.225 This sort of discrimination related to housing could
217

Id. at para. 17.
Tobin, supra note 212.
219
Angwin & Parris, supra note 212 (quoting “prominent civil rights lawyer John Relman”).
220
See id.
221
See Jan & Dwoskin, supra note 213.
222
Id.
223
See Robert P. Bartlett et al., Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. w25943, 2019), https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu
/morse/research/papers/discrim.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAC4-WLBR]; see also Pub. Affs.,
Mortgage Algorithms Perpetuate Racial Bias in Lending, Study Finds, BERKELEY NEWS
(Nov. 13, 2018), https://news.berkeley.edu/story_jump/mortgage-algorithms-perpetuate-raci
al-bias-in-lending-study-finds/ [https://perma.cc/X2RM-R64A] (“While lending discrimination has historically been caused by human prejudice, pricing disparities are increasingly the
result of formulas that use machine learning to target applicants who might shop around less
for higher-priced loans.”).
224
See Bartlett et al., supra note 223 at 6 (“Latinx and African-American pay 5.3 basis
points more in interest for purchase mortgages and 2.0 basis points for refinance mortgages
originated on FinTech platforms.”). Despite this discrimination, the algorithms do seem to
cause significantly less discrimination than face-to-face encounters. See id. (“FinTech algorithms discriminate 40% less than face-to-face lenders . . . .”).
225
See id. at 5 (“Averaging across the distribution of these products in the U.S., lending discrimination currently costs African-Americans and Latinx borrowers $765 million in extra
interest per year.”).
218
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very well also be a violation of the Fair Housing Act, as it shows a disparate
impact on minorities for a reason unrelated to a legitimate business necessity.226
Despite this evidence of pernicious biases within the housing context and
across public-interest sectors, the full extent of such biases resulting from reliance on algorithms is uncertain. Again, algorithm developers usually refuse to
reveal their algorithms and instead operate under the protection of trade secret
law. Thus, while biases can sometimes be detected through obvious disparate
impacts, researchers generally engage in these analyses in only a relatively
small number of instances. Moreover, algorithm secrecy makes it exceedingly
difficult to assess biases baked into the algorithms themselves.
C. Voting
The increasing secrecy surrounding software has created somewhat different concerns in the world of election law. Voting in elections has long raised a
number of difficulties. Two particular concerns that stand out are the fears of
inaccurate and fraudulent results.227 How can we trust election officials to accurately count millions of votes and, further, what prevents these election officials—and others—from surreptitiously flipping or discarding votes to change
election outcomes? During the infamous 2000 U.S. presidential election, Florida was mired in confusion about how punch ballots—with “hanging chads”—
should be counted.228 Following federal legislation, as well as some litigation,
many jurisdictions shifted toward electronic voting.229 Indeed, most states today
conduct at least some of their voting by electronic voting machine.230 Casting
226

See 42 U.S.C. § 3605; Bartlett et al., supra note 223, at 25 n.20 (noting “that a lender that
intentionally treated applicants differently based on a protected characteristic would be liable
under the disparate treatment theory of discrimination, for which there is no legitimatebusiness-necessity defense”).
227
See Jarrett Blanc, Electronic Voting, in CHALLENGING THE NORMS AND STANDARDS OF
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 12–13 (2007), https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/ifes_challe
nging_election_norms_and_standards_wp.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8W7-B97F].
228
See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Giving Up on Cybersecurity, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
320, 328 (2016) (“In the wake of the controversy about ‘hanging chads’ in the 2000 presidential election, jurisdictions across the United States moved to modernize their voting
equipment, including by adopting electronic voting machines or direct record electronic machines.”); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1713 (2005) (“Spurred by both legislation and litigation, states
from Florida to California have taken steps to replace the infamous ‘hanging chad’ punch
card with more modern—and supposedly more reliable—voting technology.”).
229
See Tokaji, supra note 228, at 1713; see also Daniel Castro, Stop the Presses: How Paper Trails Fail to Secure e-Voting, INFO. & TECH. INNOVATION FOUND., Sept. 2007, at 4–5,
https://www.itif.org/files/evoting.pdf?_ga=2.22630258.878851144.15827528981943129873.1582752898 [https://perma.cc/3SU7-AQL3] (suggesting that “the controversial
2000 U.S. presidential election” led to a demand for change and a movement toward using
electronic voting machines in the United States).
230
See Voting Methods and Equipment by State, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Votin
g_methods_and_equipment_by_state [https://perma.cc/2K3T-J63Z] (providing information
on voting equipment in use in each state as of November 2018). These machines are also
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votes electronically offers the potential to quickly and accurately count votes
and present electoral outcomes, and electronic voting machines are also meant
to make voting easier and reduce the state costs of voting.231 But along with
these benefits, automation brings new risks.232 Although electronic voting machines mitigate the concern that officials counting individual votes might miscount or that they could intentionally change election outcomes, electronic voting machines create new risks of inaccuracy and fraud. There is the possibility
that the algorithms and source codes on which the machines rely could contain
errors. And there is the possibility that someone could hack the system to flip,
discard, or manufacture votes, changing electoral outcomes. Unfortunately,
these are not just hypothetical situations. They have already occurred to a surprising extent.
There are several stories where the inaccuracies of electronic voting machines are apparent:
In Fairfax County, VA, in 2003, a programming error in the electronic voting
machines caused them to mysteriously subtract 100 votes from one particular
candidates’ totals.
In San Bernardino County, CA in 2001, a programming error caused the computer to look for votes in the wrong portion of the ballot in 33 local elections,
which meant that no votes registered on those ballots for that election. A recount
was done by hand.
In Volusia County, FL in 2000, an electronic voting machine gave Al Gore a final vote count of negative 16,022 votes.
The 2003 election in Boone County, IA, had the electronic vote-counting
equipment showing that more than 140,000 votes had been cast in the Nov. 4
municipal elections. The county has only 50,000 residents and less than half of
them were eligible to vote in this election.
There are literally hundreds of similar stories.233

Other inaccuracies may be more subtle. In recent years, there have been reports of vote-flipping in Georgia, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas.234 Vote flipping can result from calibration or degradation of
known as “Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Systems.” Id. Although most states use these
machines, eighteen states still rely exclusively on paper ballots, and three states conduct voting through mail. See id.
231
See Blanc, supra note 227, at 12–14.
232
See id.
233
Bruce Schneier, The Problem with Electronic Voting Machines, SCHNEIER ON SEC. (Nov.
10, 2004, 9:15 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/11/the_problem_wit.html
[https://perma.cc/575C-H6EE].
234
See Sue Halpern, How Voting-Machine Errors Reflect a Wider Crisis for American Democracy, NEW YORKER (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/howvoting-machine-errors-reflect-a-wider-crisis-for-american-democracy [https://perma.cc/HX8
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the touch screen components that voters use to record their votes.235 This is a
growing problem as states’ electronic voting machines are being used past their
expiration dates.236 In 2018, the Brennan Center reported that forty-one states
used electronic voting machines that were at least ten years old—“dangerously
close to or past the end of the expected lifespan for the core components of [the
machines].”237 Further, many of the electronic voting machines currently in use
are no longer manufactured, which has left election officials combing through
Craigslist or eBay for spare parts.238 In addition to age and maintenance concerns, there is little verification that the machines properly record votes in ordinary course. Although some voting machines provide paper receipts to voters
who then can ensure that their votes were correctly recorded, several states’
machines do not provide this information, and, in some states, only a fraction of
the machines in service provide these receipts.239 Further, even when machines
S-85TB] (explaining “how susceptible touch-screen voting machines are to error, especially
because they often rely on outdated and unsupported software”); Tim Lau, Vote Flipping
Claims Underline Urgent Need to Fix Voting Machines, BRENNAN CTR. (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/votes-were-registered-incorrectly-georgia-governors-rac
e [https://perma.cc/3PMT-Z9Q9] (“Old touchscreen voting machines are especially vulnerable to vote flipping. Many of these machines rely on outdated technology and can cause
problems such as calibration errors.”).
235
See Halpern, supra note 234 (“[T]ypically machines flip votes because they aren’t
properly calibrated. This can happen, and does happen, to candidates from any party.”); Lau,
supra note 234.
236
See Halpern, supra note 234 (“The voting machines purchased back in the early twothousands were never meant to last this long. They have a shelf life of ten, maybe fifteen
years. Many are no longer made, or the companies that manufactured them have gone out of
business, or both.”); Lau, supra note 234; see also Jonathan Lai, N.J. Was Going to Have
Paper-Based Voting Machines More than a Decade Ago. Will It Happen by 2020?, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/politics/new-jersey/nj-voting-machines
-paper-trail-20190310.html [https://perma.cc/Y22H-WEYV] (stating that New Jersey’s “current machines are nearing death”).
237
Lau, supra note 234.
238
See Halpern, supra note 234 (“To get spare parts, election officials have had to scour
eBay and Craigslist, looking for old machines that other municipalities have discarded.”);
see also Lau, supra note 234 (“[A]s of 2018, 43 states and the District of Columbia use polling machine models that are no longer manufactured. The use of these machines is troubling
because in the event of a technical malfunction, it can be difficult to find replacement parts
and technicians with the ability to repair them.”).
239
See Voting Methods and Equipment by State, supra note 230; see also Voting System Paper Trail Requirements, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATORS (June 27, 2019), http://www.ncsl.
org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voting-system-paper-trail-requirements.aspx [https://
perma.cc/Q4A2-PYQ6]; see also Castro, supra note 229, at 7 (suggesting “voter-verified
paper audit trails” would allow the voter to verify that her vote was correctly recorded but
explaining “[r]equiring that voter-verified paper audit trails be generated by DRE voting machines would increase the cost and complexity of elections”). Importantly, many states simply do not have the funds to upgrade their electronic voting machines to ones that provide paper trails. See Voting System Paper Trail Requirements, supra (explaining “that some
states . . . may have [a statutory] requirement for a voter-verifiable paper record but have not
had the funding to replace voting equipment in recent years, so in practice may have machines without a paper trail”).
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produce these paper records for voters, there seems to be no data about how
many voters review their receipts, verify the accuracy of the recorded votes,
and lodge a complaint if the machine erroneously recorded the votes.240
Beyond the accuracy concern is the alarming question of whether hackers
can physically or virtually break into these machines to alter individual votes
and election outcomes. Although recent evidence that the Russians have been
meddling in U.S. elections has heightened security concerns,241 the security of
electronic voting machines has long been in question. For decades, computer
scientists have been sounding the alarm about the vulnerabilities of these machines.242 Ever since states adopted electronic voting machines, computer scientists have repeatedly demonstrated that almost every type of machine is vulnerable to hacking.243 “The systems were not initially designed with robust
security in mind, and even where security features were included, experts have
found them to be poorly implemented with glaring holes.”244
There is an overwhelming number of examples of successful attempts to
hack electronic voting machines. In 2005, an election official in Florida’s Leon
County hired experts to test the security of the county’s voting machines.245 In
240

Provided that a voter reviews her vote to determine that it was correctly recorded, the
paper trail would allow for a back-up manual counting mechanism.
241
See Clare Malone, Russians Are Targeting Private Election Companies, Too—And States
Aren’t Doing Much About It, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, (July 30, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirty
eight.com/features/russians-are-targeting-private-election-companies-too-and-states-arent-d
oing-much-about-it/ [https://perma.cc/23GN-5EJA]; Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot
to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-electiontrump-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/2FHA-BMGQ]; Kim Zetter, The Crisis of Election Security, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/magazine/electio
n-security-crisis-midterms.html [https://perma.cc/5WN7-MCXD].
242
See Halpern, supra note 234 (stating that electronic voting machines’ “vulnerabilities
have been known for nearly two decades”); Bruce Schneier, By November, Russian Hackers
Could Target Voting Machines, WASH. POST (July 27, 2016, 12:10 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/27/by-november-russianhackers-could-target-voting-machines/ [https://perma.cc/G87R-HCEQ] (“[W]hile computer
security experts like me have sounded the alarm for many years, states have largely ignored
the threat, and the machine manufacturers have thrown up enough obfuscating babble that
election officials are largely mollified.”); Zetter, supra note 241 (explaining that a computer
scientist rang the alarm before the Help America Vote Act was passed).
243
Kim Zetter, The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/21/magazine/the-myth-of-the-hacker-proof-votingmachine.html [https://perma.cc/G64T-8J47] (“In the [approximately]15 years since electronic voting machines were first adopted by many states, numerous reports by computer scientists have shown nearly every make and model to be vulnerable to hacking.”).
244
Id.
245
See Zachary Goldfarb, As Elections Near, Officials Challenge Balloting Security in Controlled Test, Results Are Manipulated in Florida System, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2006),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2006/01/22/as-elections-near-officialschallenge-balloting-security-span-classbankheadin-controlled-test-results-are-manipulatedin-florida-systemspan/191cb7e8-a50c-4975-8992-c557ca3b2fd3/
[https://perma.cc/UL2FUHX3].
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each of the four tests, experts were able to break into the machines and alter the
(fictitious) election outcomes by manipulating the machines’ memory cards.246
In 2016, one individual—luckily a security researcher—purchased old voting
machines on eBay with the purpose of examining the machines to observe their
vulnerabilities.247 Not only did he discover that “the tamper-proof screws didn’t
work, . . . the hard drives had not been wiped . . . . [and] [t]he information [he]
found on the drives, including candidates, precincts, and the number of votes
cast on the machine, were not encrypted,” but he was easily able to reverseengineer the machines to manipulate them.248 Further, the researcher bought
additional “next generation” machines two years later and found them even
easier to hack.249
In 2018, at DEF CON 26, an annual conference that brings together some
of the best hackers in the country, hackers explored some of the vulnerabilities
of U.S. electronic voting equipment.250 In a stunning report, California’s Secretary of State, Alex Padilla, chronicled some of the findings from the conference’s “Voting Village”:
•

•
•

•

246

A voting tabulator that is currently used in 23 states is vulnerable to be
remotely hacked via a network attack. Because the device in question
is a high-speed unit designed to process a high volume of ballots for an
entire county, hacking just one of these machines could enable an attacker to flip the Electoral College and determine the outcome of a
presidential election.
A second critical vulnerability in the same machine was disclosed to
the vendor a decade ago, yet that machine, which was used into 2016,
still contains the flaw.
Another machine used in 18 states was able to be hacked in only two
minutes, while it takes the average voter six minutes to vote. This indicates one could realistically hack a voting machine in the polling place
on Election Day within the time it takes to vote.
Hackers had the ability to wirelessly reprogram, via mobile phone, a
type of electronic card used by millions of Americans to activate the

See id.
See Brian Varner, I Bought Used Voting Machines on eBay for $100 Apiece. What I
Found Was Alarming, WIRED (Oct. 25, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ibought-used-voting-machines-on-ebay/ [https://perma.cc/NA7S-ABBR].
248
Id.
249
See id. (“To my dismay, I discovered that the newer model machines—those that were
used in the 2016 election—are running Windows CE and have USB ports, along with other
components, that make them even easier to exploit than the older ones.”).
250
See MATT BLAZE ET AL., DEF CON 26 VOTING VILLAGE: REPORT ON CYBER
VULNERABILITIES IN U.S. ELECTION EQUIPMENT, DATABASES, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 3 (2018),
https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-26/DEF%20CON%2026%20voting%20village%20
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7WJ-CD66]; see also Sue Halpern, Election-Hacking Lessons
from the 2018 Def Con Hackers Conference, NEW YORKER (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/election-hacking-lessons-from-the-2018-def-con
-hackers-conference [https://perma.cc/JN35-WPUT] (“Def Con would bring more than
twenty-five-thousand of the most avid hackers in the world together . . . .”).
247
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voting terminal to cast their ballots. This vulnerability could be exploited to take over the voting machine on which they vote and cast as
many votes as the voter wanted.251

The full report, which contains expositions by various experts, sets forth an
astounding number of vulnerabilities embedded in our electronic voting machines.252 This devastating report and the smattering of anecdotes above are just
a small window into the immense tangle of electronic voting machine vulnerability issues that plague our voting systems across the country.
Manufacturers of the electronic voting machines emphatically deny that
security risks exist and that their machines are susceptible to hacking. Many of
the hacking successes, they explain, required direct access to the machine,
which they suggest is not a realistic scenario.253 Instead, the machines are airgapped—they are not connected to the internet.254 Jeanette Manfra, the now
former Assistant Secretary at the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of
Cybersecurity and Communications, has recently said that “voting machines
are physically secure, we’ve got thousands of jurisdictions across the country
that all use different things. And so while you may be able to get into a few voting machines, you can’t really affect that at scale without detection, and it
would be really hard.”255 Accordingly, Manfra concluded that “it’s actually really, really difficult to manipulate the actual vote count itself.”256
The overwhelming number of examples of successful voting machine
hacking exploits makes these denials dubious. One information technology expert who is also a former White House liaison on cybersecurity literally said
251

BLAZE ET AL., supra note 250, at 5 (emphasis omitted). The full report by Matt Blaze et
al. goes into significant detail about numerus vulnerabilities of various electronic voting machines. See generally id. (detailing machine vulnerabilities and laying out some steps that
states may take in improving the security of their elections).
252
See generally id. (detailing machine vulnerabilities and laying out some steps that states
may take in improving the security of their elections).
253
See Goldfarb, supra note 245 (explaining that Diebold said the hacking experiment in
question was “ ‘analogous to if I gave you the keys to my house and told you when I was
gone,’ . . . giving hackers ‘complete unfettered access’ to the equipment, something a responsible elections administrator would never allow”).
254
See Zetter, supra note 243.
255
Alex Hern, Kids at Hacking Conference Show How Easily US Elections Could Be Sabotaged, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018
/aug/22/us-elections-hacking-voting-machines-def-con [https://perma.cc/M54R-N9AB]. Professor Alex Halderman explained that this “diversity” argument does not eliminate the security threat. See id. In fact, although:
the diversity of US election technology poses a challenge for an attacker, . . . “that helps in some
ways and hurts in some ways.” A real threat, he points out, doesn’t need to steal every vote in
every county in every state in the country. The bad actor just needs to steal enough votes in a
few counties in America’s battleground states – just enough to swing a close election. “So rather
than diversity protecting us, we have a diversity of strength and weakness, and that’s a weakness
for everybody.”

Id.
256

Id.
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Manfra’s conclusion is “bullshit.”257 He explained that the greatest risk to the
security of voting machines is that the machines’ components are manufactured
outside of the United States, primarily in China.258 “[O]nce you’re in the
chips,” he said, “you can hack whole classes of machines, nationwide, from the
fucking Kremlin.”259 Further, the coding on these machines is quite centralized—“[o]ne large vendor codes the system for 2,000 jurisdictions across 31
states”—and if a hacker targets the coders, this could affect the functioning of
the electronic voting machines, making sabotage a real possibility.260 In addition to these concerns, even air-gapped machines that do not originally have
compromised chips or coding remain exposed. It was recently discovered that
an unknown number of machines across the country have remote-access software installed on them—probably for easy remote maintenance of the machines
by the manufacturer—meaning that they could be remotely hacked.261 Further,
election officials connect the machines to the internet to electronically transfer
vote counts on election night, making them vulnerable to hacking when they
transmit data to a central counting server.262
It is difficult to know the true extent of the accuracy and security issues
that electronic voting machines raise because, as with the criminal justice and
housing algorithms, their underlying algorithms are closely held trade secrets.
Some states have sought to examine these questionable algorithms by requiring
electronic voting machine manufacturers to disclose their algorithms to the
257

Id.
See id.
259
Id.
260
Id. Other states use local small businesses. As Halderman explained, if a hacker were to
target those small businesses, he could potentially “reprogram thousands of election machines at once.” Id.
261
See Zetter, supra note 243. In July 2018, Diebold admitted to installing remote-access
software on its voting machines, creating an even greater threat to the security of American
voting. See Kim Zetter, Top Voting Machine Vendor Admits It Installed Remote-Access
Software on Systems Sold to States, MOTHERBOARD (July 17, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mb4ezy/top-voting-machine-vendor-admits-itinstalled-remote-access-software-on-systems-sold-to-states [https://perma.cc/RKZ4-7LU6].
The company revealed this after previously denying it in a New York Times interview. See
id.; Zetter, supra note 243.
262
See Dan Patterson, Why Voting Machines in the U.S. Are Easy Targets for Hackers, CBS
NEWS (Sept. 19, 2018, 11:52 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-voting-machinesin-the-u-s-are-easy-targets-for-hackers/ [https://perma.cc/27GM-89LB] (“The other primary
vulnerability is data transmission. In 2016 Symantec Security Response director Kevin Haley told CBS News, ‘The results go from [the voting machine] into a piece of electronics that
takes it to the central counting place. That data is not encrypted and that’s vulnerable for
manipulation.’ ”); Zetter, supra note 241 (“[M]any voting machines that elections officials
insist are disconnected from the internet—and therefore beyond the reach of hackers—are in
fact accessible by way of the modems they use to transmit vote totals on election night.”).
Moreover, military personnel and citizens overseas often vote via the internet. See id. (“Although most American voters cast ballots in person or by mail, 31 states and the District of
Columbia offer some form of internet voting to military personnel and citizens living overseas.”).
258
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state before the state would do business with them. For example, North Carolina has a statute requiring manufacturers to turn over their algorithms and
source codes so that state officials can review them and verify their accuracy
and security, thereby “restor[ing] public confidence in the election process.”263
Efforts like North Carolina’s have mostly been ineffective, though. In 2005,
North Carolina’s supplier of electronic voting machines—Diebold Election
Systems, Inc.—refused to turn over its software and code, claiming that they
were secrets subject to confidentiality agreements with third parties.264 Despite
a state court in effect concluding that Diebold must comply with the state legal
requirements if it desired to sell its machines to North Carolina, the State Board
of Elections ignored this directive and authorized Diebold as an electronic voting machine vendor anyway (although Diebold ultimately withdrew as a possible vendor).265 Accordingly, the true accuracy and security of North Carolina’s
electronic voting machines remain unknown—just like the accuracy and security of machines across the country.
*****
These serious questions of accuracy, bias, and security are pervasive. For
example, an error in an algorithm powering autonomous vehicles could cause
deadly crashes. An algorithm determining the extent of someone’s healthcare
coverage could be based on biased inputs. Russia could hack U.S. drones, causing them to attack China and starting a war. Each of these eventualities could
result from simple inaccuracies, expert hacks, or perhaps even biases. Our
wired world presents all of these risks, but the full extent of them remains unknown because developers’ trade secret claims largely cloak these dangers in
secrecy.
III. IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
All of the secret algorithms underlying criminal justice prediction and conviction programs, Facebook’s targeted housing advertisements, and the electronic voting machines used throughout the United States make it difficult to
understand the full extent of the inaccuracies, biases, and security risks embedded in these algorithms. And the questions and associated problems of secret
algorithms go beyond these three areas of criminal justice, housing, and voting.
263

2005 N.C. SESS. LAW 323, https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF
/2005-2006/SL2005-323.pdf [https://perma.cc/7S7P-2NAS].
264
See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction at 6, Diebold Election Sys., Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. Elections, No.
05-CVS-15474 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9, 2005); David S. Levine, The Impact of Trade Secrecy
on Public Transparency, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 406, 419–21 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg
eds., 2011).
265
See Levine, supra note 264, at 420–21; Letter from Charles R. Owen, Div. Couns.,
Diebold Election Sys., Inc., to Gary Bartlett, Exec. Dir., North Carolina State Bd. Of Elections (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/Diebold%20Folder/Barrett%20Lette
r%2012-21-05-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-KJMP].
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For example, in the world of healthcare, experts have found that some mobile
medical apps produce erroneous results related to insulin dosage calculations or
fetal heart monitoring.266 With respect to education services, research shows
that Princeton Review uses discriminatory pricing, charging parents in Asiandominated neighborhoods more for their services—perhaps because Asian
“Tiger Moms” may be willing to pay more for their children’s standardized test
preparations.267 And Internet-of-Things devices can probably be hacked quite
easily in a number of circumstances. In fact, there are reports of wireless baby
monitors being hacked for the purpose of harassing parents, threatening child
abductions, and carrying out financial thefts.268 The potentially devastating effects of algorithm shortcomings call for greater transparency.
In April of 2019, Representative Yvette Clarke (D-NY-9) introduced a bill
in the U.S. House of Representatives to try to address some of these concerns.269 This Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019 would require companies
such as Facebook270 to conduct “automated decision system impact assessments” to examine the risks these secret algorithms pose in “contribut[ing] to
inaccurate, unfair, biased, or discriminatory decisions impacting consumers.”271
The bill lacks much specificity, leaving significant discretion to the Federal
Trade Commission to regulate in this area, therefore it is unclear how rigorous
266

See Saba Akbar et al., Safety Concerns with Consumer-Facing Mobile Health Applications and Their Consequences: A Scoping Review, 27 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 330,
331, 333–35 (2019).
267
See Julia Angwin et al., The Tiger Mom Tax: Asians Are Nearly Twice as Likely to Get a
Higher Price from Princeton Review, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 1, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.
propublica.org/article/asians-nearly-twice-as-likely-to-get-higher-price-from-princeton-revi
ew [https://perma.cc/N2V9-P3AA] (“One unexpected effect of the company’s geographic
approach to pricing is that Asians are almost twice as likely to be offered a higher price than
non-Asians . . . .”).
268
See Camila Domonoske, S.C. Mom Says Baby Monitor Was Hacked; Experts Say Many
Devices Are Vulnerable, NPR (June 5, 2018, 7:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/Iway/2018/06/05/617196788/s-c-mom-says-baby-monitor-was-hacked-experts-say-many-dev
ices-are-vulnerable [https://perma.cc/AX2G-M9KU]; Amy B. Wang, ‘I’m in Your Baby’s
Room’: A Hacker Took over a Baby Monitor and Broadcast Threats, Parents Say, WASH.
POST (Dec. 20, 2018, 10:55 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/20/
nest-cam-baby-monitor-hacked-kidnap-threat-came-device-parents-say/?utm_term=.33ff265
1306d [https://perma.cc/8UUU-BLXB].
269
See Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. [hereinafter Algorithmic Accountability Act (House)]. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) introduced an identical
bill in the Senate on the same day. See Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, S. 1108,
116th Cong.
270
The Act covers entities that “ha[ve] greater than [fifty million dollars] in average annual
gross receipts for the 3-taxable-year period preceding the most recent fiscal year” and that
“possess[] or control[] personal information on more than . . . [one million] consumers . . . or . . . [one million] consumer devices.” See Algorithmic Accountability Act (House),
supra note 269, at § 2(2)(5).
271
Id. § 2(2)(C). It would also require such companies to “assess[] . . . the risks posed by the
automated decision system to the privacy or security of personal information of consumers.”
Id.
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the regulatory strictures would be if the bill were passed. But the bill has stalled
in Congress anyway,272 and it seems unlikely that it will result in any useful
legislation.273
The inaccuracy, bias, and security risks that secret algorithms pose cry out
for intervention, but each different scenario has varying nuances that must be
taken into account. For example, where criminal justice algorithms are concerned, the problem of secrecy pits the profit motives of algorithm developers
against the justice concerns associated with incorrect and discriminatory recidivism predictions and wrongful convictions. An unfair criminal justice algorithm also negatively impacts the public because it may invalidate the bases for
justified punishment, let the guilty go free, and erode the public’s confidence in
the criminal justice system.274 Similarly, where housing algorithms are at work,
the issue of secrecy impacts the algorithm developer, the person who is directly
affected by the algorithm, and even the public more broadly by perpetuating the
pernicious effects of discrimination. In both of these contexts, it seems that the
primary justification for maintaining secrecy is supporting the creative work by
the algorithm developers—the same reason for providing IP protection under
the Constitution.275 Otherwise, transparency could mitigate many of these con272

See All Actions: H.R.2231—116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2231/all-actions?overview=closed
&KWICView=false [https://perma.cc/H52V-S5LH].
273
See H.R. 2231: Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr2231 [https://perma.cc/EB8G-KZ84] (giving
the bill a 3% chance of being passed). Cathy O’Neil also touts the value of “algorithmic audits,” suggesting that, even “before digging into the software code” it is necessary “to carry
out research” on the impact of algorithms. O’NEIL, supra note 190, at 208.
274
See James R. Acker, The Flipside Injustice of Wrongful Convictions: When the Guilty Go
Free, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2013); see also Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution,
48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1066–67 (2012) (noting the “public conception of crime . . . which is
reflected in the practices of allowing only government prosecutors, not victims, to prosecute
defendants and of captioning criminal cases as the government entity against the offender”).
Professor James Acker has explained:
Wrongful convictions entail profound social costs in addition to the hardships borne by the unfortunate individuals who are erroneously adjudged guilty. When innocents are convicted, the
guilty go free. Offenders thus remain capable of committing new crimes and exposing untold
numbers of additional citizens to continuing risk of victimization. Public confidence in the administration of the criminal law suffers when justice miscarries. At some point, as cases mount
and the attendant glare of publicity intensifies, the perceived legitimacy of the justice system and
the involved actors is jeopardized. Associated monetary costs, paid from public coffers, represent yet another tangible social consequence of wrongful convictions.

Acker, supra, at 1631.
275
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); see also W. Keith Robinson,
Economic Theory, Divided Infringement, and Enforcing Interactive Patents, 67 FLA. L. REV.
1961, 1983 (2015) (“The impetus for intellectual property law is to support individual creators.”). But see William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property:
An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 394 (1999) (“The purpose of trade secret protection is fundamentally different from copyright and patent protec-
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cerns. With respect to electronic voting machines, however, even total transparency would not solve the problem. Putting aside electronic voting machine
manufacturers’ desires to preserve the secrecy of their algorithms in order to
maintain profits, publicizing these algorithms could actually do more public
harm than good. Certainly, the risk of inaccuracies that secrecy hides and protects is problematic, but if would-be hackers were to have access to the algorithms, this could make it even easier for them to hack the machines. In this
circumstance, they essentially could have a blueprint for successfully hacking
an election.276
Addressing the full spectrum of threats that secret algorithms pose in various public-interest contexts requires balancing the risks of both secrecy and
transparency. Algorithm secrecy threatens defendants’ lives and liberty in the
criminal justice context, equal treatment of persons in the housing arena, and
the very heart of our democracy where voting is concerned. But algorithm
transparency also poses threats. Beyond exposure of algorithm-developers’ IP,
making this secret algorithm information publicly available may pose risks
such as the threat of election-hackers using voting machine algorithms to fix an
election. Such risks should also be taken into account in trying to find the proper balance between algorithm secrecy and transparency.
Balancing the risks of algorithm secrecy and transparency is not an easy
task. Courts might address each situation individually to create a patchwork of
remedies using traditional approaches like allowing documents to be filed under seal or even applying more innovative solutions in some circumstances.
This ad hoc approach could certainly lead to unpredictable results as to when
algorithms ought to be disclosed, however. Courts might instead take a more
systemic approach and target the recent changes in IP law that are contributing
to the swelling secrecy concern. The availability of patents for software is also
currently unpredictable, but loosening subject matter eligibility restrictions on
software patents could perhaps improve predictability here, as well as further
transparency goals.
A. Patchwork of Remedies
Examining the risks of secrecy and transparency in each case would allow
courts to tailor disclosure requirements to the unique facts of individual cases,
creating a broad patchwork of remedies. Such an ad hoc approach is not foreign
to judges in the trade secret context. It involves a balancing of interests, with
judges considering factors such as the relevance of the trade secret, its im-

tion; it is, namely, to secure ‘a most fundamental human right, that of privacy, which is
threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is made profitable.’ ” (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974))).
276
Moreover, the concerns of security probably outweigh the inaccuracy issues, because a
very high unintentional error rate would likely have to exist to change an election result,
which is the most important metric in the area of voting.

21 NEV. L.J. 61

Fall 2020]

SECRET ALGORITHMS

107

portance to litigation, and the harms that disclosure will cause a litigant or some
third party.277
Pursuant to this approach, there are several possibilities for addressing the
problems of algorithm secrecy, depending on the particular nuances of the case.
Perhaps the most obvious solution is turning to well-established remedies that
judges typically employ when issuing protective orders to help safeguard litigants’ trade secrets. 278 Tools that judges might employ here include making the
algorithm available for in camera examination, or making it available under
seal. Indeed, these are both typical approaches to dealing with trade secrets in
various types of litigation.279 When documents are produced for in camera examination, only the judge has access to the information; the opposing party
does not.280 Keeping trade secret information closely held in this fashion should
mitigate algorithm developers’ concerns about the release of trade secret information. However, in only very limited circumstances would allowing the
judge—and no one else—to have access to the information ease the algorithm
secrecy problem. And in most such cases, the judge would need to make use of
an independent expert who would also need access to the algorithm at issue.
Filing documents under seal might be a more practical means by which to place
a check on secret algorithms. This mechanism of filing under seal means that
the public will generally not have access to the information even though the
parties, their attorneys, and the judge will.281 However, there is always the possibility that these individuals privy to the trade secret information will violate
277

See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking A Balance: When Should Trade-Secret Law Shield Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 821 (2011) (“The courts consider a wide
range of factors that are neither definitive nor exhaustive in deciding whether good cause
exists to grant a protective order.”).
278
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (stating that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue
an order to protect a party or person . . . [by] requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in
a specified way”); Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 356
(1979) (“The federal courts have long recognized a qualified evidentiary privilege for trade
secrets and other confidential commercial information.”).
279
See 2 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 10.16, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2020)
(“A protective order allowing for in camera proceedings and permitting parties to file records under seal may be entered in trade secret cases, so long as the measures taken to maintain the integrity of the trade secrets are narrowly tailored to not needlessly encroach upon
the strong public policy objective of maintaining open courts.”); 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS,
III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 4:20, Westlaw (2d ed. database updated Aug.
2020) (“Where litigation involves trade secrets the court proceedings may be conducted in
camera and the court files impounded, so that the litigation does not compromise the trade
secrets.”); Malla Pollack, Litigating Misappropriation of Trade Secret, in 127 AM. JUR.
TRIALS § 56, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2020).
280
See In Camera Inspection, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. Bryan A. Garner, ed.,
2019) (defining “in camera inspection” as “[a] trial judge’s private consideration of evidence”).
281
See Seal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. Bryan A. Garner, ed., 2019) (defining
“seal” as “to close up tightly or keep secret” and “[t]o prevent access to (a document, record,
etc.)”).
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their obligations and reveal the secret. And once a trade secret is out, it is “lost
forever.”282 For this reason, algorithm developers may not be entirely comfortable with this potential solution to the algorithm secrecy problem. While software developers may trust their trade secrets with employees who have signed
confidentiality and non-competition agreements, they likely will not feel as
comfortable trusting opposing parties with this information, even if a potentially pilfering party would be subject to contempt orders, sanctions, breach of
contract claims, or even misappropriation of trade secret claims if the secret got
out. Success on each of these remedies is often difficult.283 For example, prevailing on a misappropriation claim would generally require the algorithm developer to establish that the opposing party actually caused the release of the
trade secret information, and this is often difficult to establish.284 Because of
these concerns, courts may be less likely to find filing documents under seal or
ordering in camera examination to tip the scale in the direction of requiring
transparency.
In some circumstances, such as in the context of HUD examining possible
Fair Housing Act violations by Facebook and its algorithms, a government official could be charged as a confidant who has access to the trade secret to examine it for legal, or other, relevance, but who would also be subject to the
remedies of trade secret law if he inappropriately disclosed the secret information. Again, from the algorithm developer’s perspective, divulging trade secret information beyond what is necessary to carry out its business is likely undesirable,285 but this may be an acceptable compromise where there is some
basic showing of, for example, a Fair Housing Act violation. The severity of
the grounded allegation may justify this required additional limited disclosure
by the algorithm developer.
Considering another dimension could very well be relevant in determining
the appropriate balance to strike between secrecy and transparency and in considering the variety of remedies that might be available in each context. And
that is the identity of the primary algorithm users. For example, in the area of
voting, individual governments are likely the primary users relying on the algorithm developers’ software to accomplish their tasks of conducting elections,
282

FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (“A trade
secret once lost is, of course, lost forever.”).
283
See Rowe, supra note 277, at 801. See generally Margit Livingston, Disobedience and
Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2000) (describing the legal confusions surrounding
contempt).
284
See Robert A. Kearney, Why the Burden of Proving Causation Should Shift to the Defendant Under the New Federal Trade Secrets Act, 13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2016)
(“[C]ausation is difficult to prove and, as it stands, it is too difficult for many misappropriation plaintiffs.” (footnotes omitted)).
285
See Rowe, supra note 277, at 801 (explaining that “none of these options [for redressing
a misappropriation claim against the government or its actors] may provide a satisfactory
remedy, and legal recourse against the government may also be tenuous.”). For a good discussion of balancing interests in determining whether a company ought to be required to disclose a trade secret to the government, see generally id.
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and this could very well be an important consideration. In the criminal justice
context, too, it could be relevant if government actors are the primary users of
tools like breathalyzers and probabilistic genotyping systems.286 In contrast, the
primary users of Facebook’s software are generally Facebook itself and its private advertisers. (In each of these cases, individuals are also users—secondary
users—when they cast their votes, benefit from a criminal conviction or fight
against a wrongful one, or answer a housing advertisement on Facebook.) But
when the government is the primary user, and where total transparency can address all but the algorithm developers’ profit concerns, perhaps the government,
on behalf of the public, could pay a premium to gain access to these trade secrets.287 This would probably make the most sense in the criminal justice arena,
where it is often the government itself making use of these programs to do its
business of convicting the guilty and freeing the innocent.288 In this context, if
the government is the primary purchaser or licensor of the product anyway,
perhaps the developer would not lose much if the government were locked into
a long-term, exclusive license arrangement with these developers.
Beyond balancing these and other interests in determining whether and to
what extent to compel trade secret disclosure, courts have occasionally found
that certain important public interests—like freedom of expression—can override trade secret interests and justify full disclosure.289 The Third Restatement
of Unfair Competition suggests the existence of such a privilege “in connection
with the disclosure of information that is relevant to public health or safety, or
to the commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public
concern.”290 Professor Pamela Samuelson offers the example of “a firm [that]

286

Cf. Global Alcohol Breathalyzer and Drug Testing Equipment Market to Reach US$
15,790.5 Million by 2027 - Coherent Market Insights, BUS. WIRE (Dec. 13, 2019, 10:37
AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191213005155/en/Global-Alcohol-Brea
thalyzer-and-Drug-Testing-Equipment-Market-to-reach-US-15790.5-Million-by-2027---Co
herent-Market-Insights [https://perma.cc/7GWV-M3GR] (noting that “[t]he Federal Departments segment held dominant position in the global alcohol breathalyzer and drugs testing
equipment market in 2018, accounting for 43.8% share in terms of value, followed by private sector, hospitals, and rehabilitation centers respectively” and explaining that “[t]he
growth of the segment is attributed to increasing drug abuse incidences and increasing number of drunk and drive cases and globally” (emphasis omitted)).
287
See Ryan, supra note 12, at 341.
288
Such an arrangement might also work well for voting algorithms, except that the security
concerns associated with algorithm transparency in this context pose additional difficulties.
289
Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the
First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 777 (2007) (“On rare occasions, defendants invoke
the First Amendment as a defense to claims of trade secrecy misappropriation.”).
290
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995); see also Samuelson,
supra note 289, at 787–88 (stating that this is a “well-recognized privilege”). The Restatement provides:
[D]isclosure of another’s trade secret for purposes other than commercial exploitation may implicate the interest in freedom of expression or advance another significant public interest. . . . The existence of a privilege to disclose another’s trade secret depends upon the circum-
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considers certain chemicals used in its manufacturing process to be trade secrets, but those chemicals are toxins whose use violates environmental protection laws.”291 Courts seem to have relied on this exception only rarely, though,
and it is even rarer that a court would find the privilege outside of the First
Amendment or whistleblower contexts. When courts do find the privilege applicable, however, they engage in interest balancing to determine whether these
important interests outweigh the trade secret interests.
Ultimately, through a balancing of interests, a variety of traditional, as well
as more innovative, approaches could be used to deal with the algorithm secrecy problem on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, managing trade secrets in litigation
is nothing new. But judges have generally been hesitant to order any disclosure
of the algorithms underlying instruments like breathalyzers and other tools that
can have real impacts on the public interest where the trade secret holder is not
party to the litigation.292 Moreover, an ad hoc balancing approach ordinarily
leads to unpredictable results. Accordingly, a more comprehensive solution
might be desirable here.
B. The Systemic Intellectual Property Solution
More effectively addressing the problem of algorithm secrecy requires
moving beyond the patchwork of remedies growing out of an ad hoc balancing
approach. Instead, it would be useful to examine the system that has played a
role in the algorithm secrecy problem: IP law. The recent surge in algorithm
secrecy has corresponded with shifts in IP jurisprudence over the past several
years.293 If the Supreme Court’s decisions in Alice and related cases make it
significantly more difficult to obtain patent protection for software, then it is
not surprising that software developers now seek to protect their work through
trade secret law instead.294 Perhaps using the levers of IP law, then, would be a
useful way to address the legal and policy concerns that the secrecy of algorithms has raised.
As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, excluding software—or even
basic algorithms—from the realm of patentable subject matter is not expressly

stances of the particular case, including the nature of the information, the purpose of the disclosure, and the means by which the actor acquired the information.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995).
291
Samuelson, supra note 289, at 788.
292
See Rowe, supra note 277, at 819–20 (“Even in the private-party discovery disputes, the
courts are more protective toward permitting discovery of third parties who are not a party to
the litigation and are far less likely to compel disclosure of their trade secrets.”); Ryan, supra
note 12, at 307 (“Despite this need for the program information that controls breathalyzers,
courts have generally refused to grant defendants access to these algorithms and source
codes.”).
293
See supra Part I.
294
See supra Section I.C.
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required by either the Constitution or the Patent Act.295 Instead, the Constitution just vests power in Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts” by offering patent rights to inventors for their “[d]iscoveries,”296
and the Patent Act purports to provide protection for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”297 Moreover, even the
House and Senate reports accompanying the passage of § 101 articulated the
law’s substantial breadth, stating that “anything under the sun that is made by
man” should be patentable so long as it meets the other requirements of the
Act.298 Accordingly, the stringent test the Court used in Alice to generally exclude software from patentability not only was a sharp change in law, but it was
also contrary to the explicit terms of the governing statute and potentially at
odds with the spirit of the Constitution.299
The Alice test largely sweeping software outside the bounds of patentability was based on policy rather than constitutional or statutory grounds. The
broad exceptions to § 101 prohibiting the patentability of principles can be
traced back to the 1852 case of Le Roy v. Tatham,300 where the Court stated
(without references): “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either
of them an exclusive right.”301 The Court explained that, where such principles
are involved, it is “the processes used to extract, modify, and concentrate natural agencies” that “constitute the invention”; “the invention is not in discover295

See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (referring to the exception as “implicit”); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
70 (2012) (“The Court has long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception. ‘Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.” (internal
alterations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981))); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013) (“We have ‘long held
that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’ ” (internal alteration omitted) (quoting Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. at 70)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588–89 (1978) (“The
plain language of § 101 does not answer the question. . . . The holding that the discovery of
th[e] method [in Benson] could not be patented as a ‘process’ forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101.”).
296
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
297
35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
298
S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); see also Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (referencing the committee reports). Although
Congress overhauled the Patent Act with the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 2011, it
mostly left the subject matter eligibility question untouched. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011) (amending various parts of the Patent Act, but, with respect to subject matter eligibility, providing only that, “no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism”).
299
Some scholars argue that the Constitution’s language limits Congress to enact only patent-related laws that further “progress” in the sense that it advances civilization. See Jake
Linford, Datamining the Meaning(s) of Progress, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1531 (2017). For a
good summary as to various plausible interpretations of “progress,” see generally id.
300
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852).
301
Id. at 175.
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ing [the principles], but in applying them to useful objects.”302 Although the
Court’s discussion about the patentability of principles dates back almost two
centuries, its discussions about the more specific exception related to algorithms is newer. In the 1939 case of Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v.
Radio Corp. of America,303 the Court alluded to algorithms when explaining
that, “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of
knowledge of scientific truth may be.”304 And it finally specifically addressed
algorithms in the 1972 Benson case, where it suggested that it would be improper to patent the computer program at issue.305 The concern there was that
allowing the patent would essentially grant a monopoly on an algorithm, preventing other inventors from building on this basic principle, thereby arresting
innovation.306 Despite concluding that the program at issue was not patentable,
however, the Court indicated that perhaps software should be patentable but
that this is “a policy matter to which [the Court is] not competent to speak.”307
This nuance seems to have been lost when the Court decided Parker six years
later.308 When the Court subsequently decided Diehr in 1981, it clarified that,
although the policy decision that algorithms are unpatentable stood, that did not
mean that inventions based on algorithms could not be patented.309 The Court
302
303
304
305

Id.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
Id. at 94.
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972). The Gottschalk Court explained:
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would be the result if
the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case.
The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent
would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on
the algorithm itself.

Id.
306

See id. at 67–68, 71 (reciting precedent providing that one should not be granted a legal
monopoly on an idea and stating that “in practical effect [the patenting of an idea] would be
the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented
in this case.”).
307
Id. at 72 (“It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a
policy matter to which we are not competent to speak. The President’s Commission on the
Patent System rejected the proposal that these programs be patentable . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
308
See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (“In Gottschalk v. Benson, we held that
the discovery of a novel and useful mathematical formula may not be patented.” (internal
citation omitted)). But cf. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“This Court has undoubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms. Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas.”).
309
See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 (reciting the notion that ideas and principles are not patentable, explaining that the Court’s precedents “stand for no more than these long-established
principles,” and stating that the invention at issue is patentable even though, “in several steps
of the process[,] a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer are used”).
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thus delimited the policy exception, finding that, so long as an algorithm were
paired with a physical step—even one already known in the art—the invention
was patent-eligible.310 The Alice Court broadened the policy exception, however, making it much more difficult to patent algorithm-based inventions.
Today, where software touches basically every facet of life, IP policy
considerations should be viewed more broadly. Courts should look beyond the
basic trade-offs of the innovation incentive created by a limited monopoly
versus the costs to innovation when preventing another from building on
existing principles311 and consider the secrecy consequences of generally
sweeping software outside the boundaries of patentability. Essentially closing
off this avenue to inventors creates almost an entire industry of secrecy that
affects and potentially negatively impacts the public interest. Secrecy can
undermine trust in our criminal justice system. It can allow unfair biases to
flourish in our society. And it can erode the trust in our government that is
essential to a functioning democracy. When engaging in a decision about the
scope of subject matter eligibility, these broader policy considerations should
also be deemed relevant.312
For example, when determining the patentability of software powering a
probabilistic genotyping system used to convict criminals, a decisionmaker—
whether that be the PTO or a court—might take into account considerations
beyond just the extent to which issuing a software patent might stifle
innovation by effectively preempting use of the underlying algorithm. This
narrow focus on stifling innovation was of course the concern behind Alice’s
less-than-clear test concentrating on whether the combination of claims
includes an “inventive concept.”313 This test has left a wake of uncertainty
about where exactly the line between patent eligibility and non-eligibility lies.
Within this area of uncertainy, decisionmakers might also consider the
consequences of the inventor turning to trade secret law to protect his
invention. In this example, where the software is used to convict criminals, a
lack of transparency and the shield of trade secret law could have devastating
effects, such as wrongfully convicting an innocent person.314 And the
disadvantages of finding subject matter eligiblity for the software could very
well pale in comparison. This balancing might mirror some of the balancing
that takes place when courts determine whether and under which conditions a
party must disclose a trade secret.315 It might also reflect the balancing that
310

See id. at 184; see also supra text accompanying note 99.
See supra text accompanying notes 305–306.
312
As Thomas Jefferson suggested, “the exclusive right to invention [is] . . . for the benefit
of society.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 335 (Andrew Adgate Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh
eds., 1903).
313
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217, 221 (2014); supra text accompanying
note 140.
314
See supra Section II.A.
315
See supra text accompanying notes 277–79.
311
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courts occasionally engage in when determining whether the secrecy of trade
secret law must yield to First Amendment or whistleblower concerns.316 But
when the balancing takes place under the umbrella of patent eligibility, at least
the property owner potentially receives something in return for disclosure: a
twenty-year patent.
Certainly, a more lenient approach to subject matter eligibility for patents
would not be a cure-all for harms created by software secrecy. Depending on
the nature of the invention, the would-be patentee might continue to prefer
trade secret protection over patent protection.317 But, as in other areas of law,318
patent law can affect individuals’ decisions. It can be used to nudge inventors
toward transparency when that decision will better serve the public interest.
Ultimately, assessing the potentially negative effects from narrowly construing
patent eligibility could push courts back in the more patent-permissive direction
of Diehr and the Federal Circuit cases suggesting that the software industry is
not largely excluded from successfully pursuing patents on their inventions.
And this would likely induce at least some software inventors to pursue patent
protection rather than trade secret protection, thus increasing transparency.
The Constitution focuses on promoting “[p]rogress” through science and
the arts,319 and transparency is key to such progress.320 Not only is transparency
important so other would-be innovators can build upon one’s inventions, but it
is also key to ensuring that an invention is truly useful—in the case of
breathalyzers, for example, that it provides accurate results. While the
usefulness, or utility, requirement of § 101 is ordinarily not stringently applied
316

See Sandeen & Mylly, supra note 31, at 42; see also Samuelson, supra note 289, at 839–
40 (2007) (suggesting that certain factors set out in case law “will obviously play out differently in varying factual contexts, but they provide a sound mechanism for balancing the First
Amendment interests of journalists and publishers and those of trade secret claimants in
weighing whether confidential source information should be disclosed to trade secret claimants”).
317
See supra text accompanying notes 36–44.
318
See, e.g., Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV.
373, 397 (1994) (“Federal income tax law promotes home ownership in a number of ways,
the most notable being the allowance of a deduction for home mortgage interest.”). Indeed,
before the Court found it to be a First Amendment violation, Congress required decisionmakers to consider the effects of negative words on the general public by prohibiting
disparaging trademarks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744,
1765 (2017) (“[W]e hold that the disparagement clause violates the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment.”).
319
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
320
Indeed, the majority of scholars believe that “progress” means further advancing
knowledge. See Linford, supra note 299, at 1545 (“[M]ost scholars have embraced a series
of meanings that coalesce around the notion that progress means advancement in
knowledge, using phrases like ‘the encouragement of learning’ to refine the concept.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 150–51 (2002))).
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to limit patent eligibility,321 § 101’s focus on promoting “new and useful”
inventions highlights how the transparency of patents can further usefulness,
and thus “[pr]ogress,” through science and the arts.322 Rather than sharply
limiting patents on software powering instruments ranging from breathalyzers
to electronic voting machines, returning to a more generous and workable
standard for software that acknowledges secrecy’s impact on the public interest
would further progress in this field and benefit the public interest by fostering
greater transparency where important considerations like equality, life, and
liberty are at stake.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alice significantly curtailed subject matter eligibility for patents. This involved exempting from patent protection an overwhelming swath of software that was previously patentable. Making it more difficult to patent software has pushed at least some developers to
protect their intellectual property through trade secrets instead. This has resulted in considerable secrecy now cloaking the workings and uses of numerous
software offerings and their underlying algorithms. Many of these algorithms
affect the public interest, but the secrecy shrouding them has made it close to
impossible to assess whether the algorithms suffer from risks related to inaccuracies, biases, or security flaws. And the devastating effects of inaccurate, biased, or insecure algorithms and software are heightened in the public interest
realm, leading to severe effects such as wrongful convictions, ubiquitous biases
in housing, and undermining the sacred act of voting in a democracy. One
might address these concerns in a patchwork manner by balancing the secrecy
and transparency risks in each unique situation. But attacking one source of the
secrecy problem—recent changes in IP law—could effectively address the matter in a more global fashion. The Alice Court’s shift in doctrine was not driven
by the Constitution or even the terms of the governing statute. Instead, policy
concerns drove the Court’s decision. Yet the Court neglected to examine the
significant impact that propelling software and algorithm developers toward
secrecy would have on the public interest overall. These effects should have
321

See Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 58
(2011) (“In the broad scheme of things, . . . the requirement that an invention be useful has
been nearly nonexistent—essentially ignored. The level of ‘utility’ an applicant must currently demonstrate to obtain a patent is extremely low: the invention need only operate as
described and potentially provide some de minimis public benefit.” (footnote omitted)). But
cf. Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1049–50 (2014) (arguing that characterizing the usefulness requirement as de minimis is inaccurate and stating
that “[i]t is more correct to say that the utility threshold is decidedly biased—a de minimis
threshold for some inventions but a considerably more stringent one for others” (emphasis
omitted)). Note that some experts suggest that utility is only part of the usefulness requirement. See Risch, supra, at 58–59 (arguing that § 101’s “utility requirement (as currently interpreted) is only a part of an invention’s usefulness”).
322
See supra note 320.
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moved the Court in Alice, and these effects should influence the Court in reshaping subject matter eligibility for patents going forward.

